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The specter of inadvertently disclosing the confidences of a client 
hangs over every attorney. With the growth of complex litigation, 
inadvertent disclosure1 of privileged materials is an increasingly 
common problem, particularly in cases involving the production of large 
amounts of material.' One can easily imagine how, in the course of a 
massive document production, privileged materials escape the attention 
of the producing side and are inadvertently disclosed. 
Such disclosure raises a number of issues. One issue is whether the 
disclosure waives the attorney-client privilege: which in turn involves 
1. "Inadvertent disclosure" has been defined as "the unintentional revelation of the 
contents of a document otherwise subject to the attorney-client privilege." Note, Inadvertent 
Disclosure of Documents Subject to the Attorney-Client Privilege, 82 MICH. L. REV. 598, 598 
n.5 (1983). "Inadvertent disclosure" should be distinguished from involuntary disclosure that 
results from theft or illegal eavesdropping, see generally Natalie A. Kanellis, Comment, 
Applicability of the Attorney-Client Privilege to Communications Intercepted by Third Parties, 
69 IOWA L. REV. 263 (1983) (describing the circumstances under which the attorney-client 
privilege should attach to communications discovered by a third party), or intentional actions of 
disgruntled employees, see In re Grand Jury Proceedings Involving Berkley & Co., 466 F. Supp. 
863 (D. Minn. 1979) (stating that documents given to an adversary by a client's employee do 
not automatically lose privileged status). The difference between an inadvertent disclosure and 
and involuntary disclosure is that the former is caused by actions of the client or its attorney 
acting as its agent while the latter is caused by an outside force. See Note, supra, at 612-14. 
~nstances where a party voluntarily discloses information and later regrets it are also 
distinguishable. See Note, supra, at 604-05. One commentator gives the example of a party who 
intentionally reveals privileged information during settlement discussions as a negotiating tactic. 
Richard L. Marcus, The Perih of Privilege: Waiver and the Litigator, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1605, 
1633 (1986). The party may not be able to later claim the privilege, if a settlement is not 
reached, on the grounds that he is sorry he revealed the information. Id. Different considerations 
are raised by these different forms of disclosure. This Article is limited to an analysis of 
implications of an inadvertent waiver. 
2. A rough guide to the increasing number of inadvertent disclosures is the increase in 
reported cases addressing the issue. A computer search covering all jurisdictions found that 
through 1979, only 14 opinions discusssed the topic. From 1980 to August 1994, 171 opinions 
addressed the topic. Search of LEXIS, Genfed Library, Mega file (Aug. 1994). Practitioners have 
attempted to minimize the effects of inadvertent disclosures by including in their discovery 
request responses language reserving their rights to claim privilege on inadvertently disclosed 
materials. See, e.g., W.R. Grace & Co. v. Pullman, Inc., 446 F. Supp. 771, 774 (W.D. Okla. 
1976). 
Some courts have ruled that the reservation of rights is unenforceable. See, e.g., id. at 775 
("The purported reservation contained in [defendant's] Response was in effect a legal nullity. 
One cannot produce documents and later assert a privilege which ceases to exist because of the 
production."). A better view is that the disclaimers alone should not be a litmus test of waiver, 
but should be considered as one factor in judging whether an attorney took reasonable 
precautions to avoid disclosure. 
3. The following is a standard working definition of the attorney-client privilege that will 
be used throughout this Article: 
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whether the attorney intended to waive the privilege, and whether the 
attorney had authority from the client to make such a waiver. A second 
issue deals with the remedies available to the client if there is a waiver. 
A third issue concerns the conflict between the courts' rules concerning 
an inadvertent disclosure and the professional bar's ethical rules of 
professional responsibility. 
To put this conflict into perspective, consider the following model: 
Companies A and B are involved in a large contract dispute that has 
resulted in a lawsuit. B's attorney serves a document request upon A's 
Attorney for all documents related to the transaction. Within the 10,000 
documents A's attorneys produce are ten privileged documents contain- 
ing legal advice from A's former attorneys to A. Immediately after 
realizing the error, A's attorneys request that the documents be returned. 
B's attorneys refuse the demand. A's attorneys then go to court for a 
protective order. Depending upon the jurisdiction, this inadvertent 
disclosure may or may not be treated as a waiver of the attorney-client 
pri~ilege.~ Additionally, the disclosure and the opposing counsel's 
refusal to return the document may violate the ethical obligations of 
both attorneys.' 
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought, (2) from a professional legal 
adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that purpose, (4) 
made in confidence, (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance permanently protected, 
(7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal adviser, (8) except the protection be 
waived. 
8 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW 3 2292, at 554 (John T. 
McNaughton rev., 1961) (emphasis omitted). 
4. Compare Georgetown Manor, Inc. v. Ethan Allen, Inc., 753 F. Supp. 936, 938 (S.D. 
Fla. 1991) (stating that inadvertent disclosure of documents is insufficient to constitute a waiver 
of the attorney-client privilege) with International Digital Sys. Corp. v. Digital Equip. Corp., 120 
F.R.D. 445, 450 (D. Mass. 1988) (holding that the attorney-client privilege is automatically 
waived with inadvertent production) and Underwater Storage, Inc. v. United States Rubber Co., 
314 E Supp. 546,549 (D.D.C. 1970) (stating that once a privileged document is produced, the 
attorney-client privilege is automatically waived). 
5. See infa part II for a discussion of the attorney's ethical duty of confidentiality. In 
addition to the ethical duty of confidentiality, a competing ethical duty may exist in Model Rule 
1.3 which requires an attorney to act with "reasonable diligence arid promptness in representing 
a client." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.3 (1994 ed.) [hereinafter MODEL 
RULES]. The comment to Rule 1.3 notes that the rule requires an attorney to "act with 
commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy upon the 
client's behalf." Id. Rule 1.3 cmt. At least one court has suggested that an attorney is bound by 
professional obligations to use information that is inadvertently disclosed for the client's benefit. 
See ~erojet-General Corp. v. Transport Indem. Ins., 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 862, g67 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1993). 
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Only by examining the goals served by the attorney-client privilege 
and the ethical rules on confidentiality can one decide whether 
inadvertent disclosure waives the attorney-client privilege. Commenta- 
tors agree that the purpose of both the attorney-client privilege and the 
ethical rules regarding confidentiality is to encourage frank cornmunica- 
tion between the client and his a t t~rney.~ Such openness, in turn, 
"promote[s] broader public interest[ ] in the observance of law and 
administration of j~st ice."~ 
Many cases and commentators have focused solely on answering the 
narrow question of whether there has been a waiver of the attorney- 
client privilege when privileged documents are inadvertently disclosed.' 
Accordingly, their analyses have not considered all of the broader policy 
goals implicated by the inquiry. Many commentators are primarily 
concerned with how to limit waiver of the attorney-client pri~ilege.~ For 
example, at least one commentator has stressed issues of fairness," 
while another has analogized the question to a determination of property 
rights." Too little attention, however, has been given to the question 
of fostering attorney responsibility to maintain confidentiality and the 
results of the inadvertent disclosure in terms of attorney culpability. 
6. See infra notes 121-29 and accompanying text. 
7. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981). 
8. See George A. Davidson & William H. Voth, Waiver of the Attorney-Client Privilege, 
64 OR. L. REV. 637, 640-46 (1986); James M. Grippando, Attorney-Client Privilege: Implied 
Waiver Through Inadvertent Disclosure of Documents, 39 U .  MIAMI L. REV. 51 1, 512-22 
(1 985); Scott L. Lanin, Survey of New York Practice: Developments in the Law, 62 ST. JOHN'S 
L. REV. 751, 752-59 (1988); Wesley M. Ayres, Comment, Attorney-Client Privilege: The 
Necessity of Intent to Waive the Privilege in Inadvertent Disclosure Cases, 18 PAC. L.J. 59.70- 
80 (1986); Kanellis, supra note 1, at 276-77; Note, supra note 1, at 623-24. 
9. Unlike the courts, which traditionally have had antagonism toward the attorney-client 
privilege, and have therefore given expansive interpretation to waiver, see, e.g., Permian Corp. 
v. United States, 665 F.2d 1214, 1221 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (holding that a corporation waived any 
protection of the attorney-client privilege by turning over documents to the Securities and 
Exchange Commission), most commentators have asserted that the privilege's benefits outweigh 
its costs, that waiver be more limited, and have advocated adoption of various tests. See, e.g., 
Davidson & Voth, supra note 8, at 645-46 (recommending a subjective intent test); Grippando, 
supra note 8, at 527 (advocating a conduct analysis approach); Roberta M. Harding, Waiver: A 
Comprehensive Analysis of a Consequence of Inadvertently Producing Documents Protected by 
the Attorney-Client Privilege, 42 CATH. U. L. REV. 465,485 (1993) (advocating a variation of 
the subjective intent test which creates a rebuttable presumption against waiver); Marcus, supra 
note 1, at 1654 (suggesting a fairness approach); Alan J. Meese, Inadvertent Waiver of the 
Attorney-Client Privilege by Disclosure of Documents: An Economic Analysis. 23 CREIGHTON 
L. REV. 513, 543 (1990) (arguing for a conduct standard which emphasizes prevention of 
inadvertent disclosure). 
10. See Marcus, supra note 1, at 1654. 
11. See Meese, supra note 9, at 543. 
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This Article suggests that fostering the development of attorney 
responsibility should be the central goal in addressing the issues raised 
by the inadvertent disclosure. Deciding the waiver issue by concentrat- 
ing on attorney responsibility will help prevent inadvertent disclosures 
(and resultant waivers) by impressing upon the attorney the need to take 
care to avoid them. When disclosures inadvertently occur, the amount 
of precautions the attorney took (albeit unsuccessfully) should determine 
whether the privilege is waived. Placing the onus of precautions against 
inadvertent disclosure on the attorney is not only beneficial to the client, 
but also aids the profession, and the overall administration of justice. 
These systemic goals underlie the doctrines of privilege and waiver. 
American courts use three different tests to evaluate whether 
inadvertent disclosure waives the attorney-client privilege. All three tests 
use intent as the basis of a waiver, but each uses a different measure- 
ment of intent. The traditional test focuses solely on the act of disclo- 
sure, deeming it representative of the. client's intent to waive his 
privilege.12 The subjective intent test is premised on the client's actual 
desire to waive the privilege; it therefore holds that an inadvertent 
disclosure never amounts to a waiver.I3 The reasonable precautions test 
measures intent to waive by the precautions taken to prevent inadvertent 
disclos~re.'~ 
This Article focuses on the attorney's legal and ethical responsibili- 
ties to the client and analyzes the three tests of waiver the courts use in 
terms of their impact on promoting attorney responsibility. Part One 
describes the current caselaw governing inadvertent disclosure. It also 
describes the American Bar Association's (ABA) first formal ethical 
opinion on inadvertently disclosed information that appears to advocate 
a variation of the subjective intent test by creating a presumption against 
waiver that must be overcome by the receiving attorney." The opinion 
takes this position by stressing the forwarding attorney's property rights 
in the  document.^.'^ 
12. See, 'e.g., W.R. Grace, 446 E Supp. at 775. 
13. See Shriver v. Baskin-Robbins Ice Cream Co., 145 F.R.D. 112, 115 (D. Colo. 1992); 
Georgetown Manor, 753 F. Supp. at 938; Mendenhall v. Barber-Greene Co., 531 E Supp. 951, 
954-55 (N.D. Ill. 1982); Pitard v. Stillwater Transfer & Storage Co., 589 So. 2d 1127, 1128-29 
(La. Ct. App. 1991). 
14. See h i s  Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc., v. Levi Strauss & Co., 104 F.R.D. 103, 105 
(S.D.N.Y. 1985) (describing a five-factor analysis). 
15. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 92-368 
(1992), reprinted in LAWYER'S MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT: MANUAL (ABAIBNA) 
at 1001: 155 [hereinafter ABA]. 
16. See id. at 1001:159 (referring to an inadvertent mailing as creating a constructive 
bailment or a bailment implied by law). 
Heinonline - -  47 Fla. L. Rev. 163 1995 
164 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47 
Part Two discusses the attorney-client privilege and its analytic 
counterpart, the ethical duty of maintaining confidentiality, identifies the 
goals of each and the tension that has developed between them, and how 
they may be reconciled. Part Three analyzes each test from an attorney- 
responsibility perspective and concludes that the reasonable-precautions 
test best serves the client's interests, and therefore has systemic benefits, 
by properly forcing the attorney to bear the risks of inadvertent 
disclosure. It reconciles the ABA opinion with this conclusion by 
making two suggestions. First, to the extent that one views the AE3A 
opinion as adopting the subjective intent test, the opinion should be 
limited to its facts-the instance of a single, errant disclosure, rather 
than applying it to the far more common occurrence of the inadvertent 
disclosures taking place within a complex litigation with massive 
document productions. Second, the Article demonstrates that the AE3A 
opinion, with its emphasis on property rights, in fact, endorses a 
reasonable precautions test. 
Before turning to the three different tests used in deciding whether 
an inadvertent disclosure of privileged materials waives the attorney- 
client privilege, two preliminary subjects require attention: (I) attorney 
authority to waive, and (2) intent to waive. 
A. Authority to Waive the Privilege 
The first step in deciding the question of waiver is the determination 
of who has the authority to waive the privilege. While the attorney- 
client privilege rests solely with the client,17 only a minority of cases 
17. See, e.g., ALA. CODE 5 12-21-161 (1975) ("No attorney . . . shall be competent or 
compelled to testify in any court in this state for or against the client as to any matter or thing, 
knowledge of which may have been acquired from the client, or as to advice or counsel to the 
client given by virtue of the relation as attorney . . . unless called to testify by the client . . . .") 
(emphasis added); CAL. EVID. CODE 5 954 (West Supp. 1994) ('yT]he client, whether or not a 
party, has a privilege to refuse to disclose, and to prevent another from disclosing, a confidential 
communication between client and lawyer. . . .") (emphasis added); IDAHO CODE 5 9-203 
(1947) ("An attorney cannot, without the consent of his client, be examined as to any 
communication made by the client to him, or his advice given thereon in the course of 
professional employment."); KAN. STAT. ANN. 3 60-426 (1994) ("[C]ommunications found by 
the judge to have been between lawyer and his or her client in the course of that relationship 
and in professional confidence, are privileged, and a client has a privilege . . . to prevent his 
or her lawyer from disclosing it.") (emphasis added); MONT. CODE ANN. 8 26-1-803 (1993) 
("An attorney cannot, without the consent of his client, be examined as to any communication 
made by the client to him or his advice given to the client in the course of professional 
employment."); N.Y. Clv. PRAC. L. & R. 4503 (McKinney 1993) ("Unless the client waives the 
Heinonline - -  47 Fla. L. Rev. 164 1995 
19951 INADVERTENT DISCLOSURE OF PRIVILEGED MATERIAU 165 
hold that waiver may only be accomplished by the client." The 
majority use the concept of implied authority to find waiver when there 
is something less than the classic situation of a client intentionally 
divulging confidences to a third-part~.'~ An attorney, designated by the 
client as his agent to comply with a document production request, is 
deemed to have implicit authority to waive the client's privilege?' 
B. The Intent to Waive 
Intent is the cornerstone of the waiver issue under all of the current 
tests. Under a purist view, waiver is deemed the " 'intentional relin- 
quishment . . . of a known right,' " that only the client may exercise?' 
Many courts are less rigid, however, and hold that intent, as well as 
authority to waive, may be implicit.22 The common thread among all 
of the waiver tests is that it is the client's intent that governs. Even 
cases adopting the concept of implicit authority that allows the attorney 
to waive the privilege, still speak of waiver as representing a manifesta- 
privilege, an attorney . . . shall not disclose, or be allowed to disclose such communica- 
tion . . . ."). Resting the privilege with the client is a shift from early common law days where 
the privilege rested with the attorney. See WIGMORE, supra note 3, 8 2290. 
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct also make confidentiality a client's right. MODEL 
RULES, supra note 5, Rule 1.6(a) ("A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to 
representation of a client unless the client consents after consultation. . . .") (emphasis added). 
The same approach W a s  taken by the Model Code of Professional Responsibility, the predecessor 
to the Model Rules. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(C) (1986) 
("A lawyer may reveal . . . [clonfidences or secrets with the consent of the client or clients 
affected, but only after a full disclosure to them.") (emphasis added). 
18. See Mendenhall, 531 F. Supp. at 955. Courts adopting the subjective intent test to 
address the issue of inadvertent disclosure take a purist view of waiver as the intentional 
relinquishment or abandonment of a known right, and roundly criticize the attempts to gloss over 
this fundamental requirement. Id. 
19. See ICI Americas Inc. v. Wanamaker, No. 88-1346, 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4057, at 
*7-*8 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 18, 1989); Permian, 665 F.2d at 1219-21 (reasoning that the privilege 
could not be waived for one opponent and then subsequently invoked against another opponent); 
Goldsborough v. Eagle Crest Partners, Ltd., 838 P.2d 1069, 1073 (Or. 1992); cf: Johnson v. 
Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468 (1938) (requiring competent and intelligent waiver by accused to 
waive right to counsel). 
20. Goldrborough, 838 P.2d at 1073. This adoption is rarely explicit-most cases do not 
lay out the analytical groundwork of expressing that the attorney is the client's agent. See 
Manufacturer & Traders Trust Co. v. Servotronics, 522 N.Y.S.2d 999, 1004 (App. Div. 1987). 
See generally Davidson & Voth, supra note 8, at 645-46 (discussing the application of agency 
theory to attorney-client privilege); Note, supra note 1, at 604 n.27 (stating that "when an 
attorney negotiates or litigates on behalf of a client, the courts will probably conclude that the 
client has impliedly authorized the attorney to waive his privilege"). 
21. Mendenhall, 531 F. Supp. at 955 (quoting Johnson, 304 U.S. at 464). 
22. See, e.g., United States v. Kelsey-Hayes Wheel Co., 15 F.R.D. 461,465 (E.D. Mich. 
1954). 
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tion of the client's intent; no court has gone so far as to measure waiver 
by the attorney's intent?3 
The differing views on measuring the client's intent have spurred the 
development of four schools of thought on the issue of inadvertently 
disclosed documents. The four tests represent a spectrum ranging from 
one absolute view embodied by the traditional test that a party's intent 
to waive is established by the fact of disclosure24 to the polar view 
embraced by the subjective intent test that a party's intent to waive must 
be explicit, thereby eliminating waiver through inadvertency?' The 
reasonable precautions test stands in the center of the spectrum, judging 
waiver by the circumstances surrounding the d i sc l~sure .~~  Closely 
aligned to the subjective intent test is the ABA view that creates a 
presumption against ~ a i v e r . 2 ~  
1. The Traditional Test 
The traditional test of inadvertent disclosure rests on Dean 
Wigmore's view, as adopted by many courts, that the attorney-client 
privilege suppresses the truth?* These courts counter the privilege's 
perceived costs in shielding relevant evidence by giving waiver an 
expansive definiti~n?~ In such courts, the client's intent to disclose 
privileged materials and to waive the privilege is found simply by the 
disclosure itself.30 Thus, while the traditional test ostensibly acknowl- 
edges that intent is the basis of waiver, intent is established solely by 
the act of disclosure. This approach is similar to the principle of strict 
23. See, e.g., Goldsborough, 838 P.2d at 1073. As some commentators have pointed out, 
attempting to measure intent in an inadvertent disclosure situation is a legal fiction since by 
definition, no specific intent by the client to disclose exists in the inadvertent situation. See 
Marcus, supra note 1, at 1607 ("[I]ntention[ ] is not a useful guide because truly intentional 
waivers are extremely rare."); Developments in the Law-Privileged Communication: VII. 
Implied Waiver, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1629, 1664 (1985) ("[A]nalysis of the privilege-holder's 
intent is unhelpful . . . ."). 
24. See, e.g., Kelsey-Hayes, 15 F.R.D. at 465. 
25. See, e.g., Mendenhall, 531 F. Supp. at 955. 
26. See, e.g., Lois Sportswear, 104 F.R.D. at 105. 
27. See ABA, supra note 15, at 1001: 155. 
28. WIGMORE, supra note 3, 5 2291, at 557 (explaining that the attorney-client privilege 
is an exception to the duty to disclose, and thus an obstacle in discovering the truth). For cases 
utilizing the traditional inadvertent waiver test, see Wichita Land & Cattle Co. v. American Fed. 
Bank, 148 F.R.D. 456, 457 (D.D.C. 1992); International Digital Sys. Corp. v. Digital Equip. 
Corp., 120 F.R.D. 445,449-50 (D. Mass. 1988); W.R. Grace, 446 F. Supp. at 775; Underwater 
Storage, Inc. v. United States Rubber Co., 314 F. Supp. 546, 549 (D.D.C. 1970). 
29. See, e.g., W.R. Grace, 446 F. Supp. at 775; Underwater Storage, 3 14 F. Supp. at 549. 
30. See, e.g., W.R. Grace, 446 F. Supp. at 775; Underwater Storage, 3 14 F. Supp. at 549. 
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liability used in tort and criminal offenses where the act is the decisive 
factor in deciding ~ulpability.~' 
Two rationales support the traditional test's measure of the act as the 
bright-line test of the client's intent. The first rationale is that the client 
has the ability to protect the confidentiality of privileged materials and 
that, therefore, any disclosure is a manifestation of the client's lack of 
intent to keep the confidential status of the rnaterial~?~ The second 
rationale is that once the confidence is revealed, there is nothing left to 
protect and therefore, the privilege is ~a ived .3~  
The seminal traditional test case is United States v. Kelsey-Hayes 
Wheel C O . , ~ ~  which involved an anti-trust action?' The plaintiff sought 
to have one of the defendants admit the genuineness of 1000 documents 
the plaintiff had culled during an examination of the defendant's files?6 
The defendant objected to this request as to twenty-nine documents 
inadvertently included in the files given to the plaintiff, which it claimed 
were communications between attorney and ~lient.3~ Rejecting the 
defendant's contention, the court reasoned that the attorney-client 
privilege only covers communications "as to which there is an intention 
of c~nfidentiality."~~ The court noted that the defendant's own act of 
turning over privileged documents caused the plaintiff to view its 
31. See, e.g., United States v. Park, 421 U.S: 658,668 (1975) (ruling that no mens rea was 
needed for a finding of guilt under a strict liability statute); Commonwealth v. Miller, 432 
N.E.2d 463,465 (Mass. 1982) (holding that the act of statutory rape was sufficient for a finding 
of guilt; no mens rea was required); State v. Stepniewski, 314 N.W.2d 98, 104 (Wis. 1982) 
(holding that no mens rea was needed under state unfair trade practices law). 
32. See W.R. Grace, 446 F. Supp. at 775; Underwater Storage, 314 F. Supp. at 549. 
33. See, e.g., Golden Valley Microwave Foods, Inc. v. Weaver Popcorn Co., 132 ER.D. 
204,209 (N.D. Ind. 1990); W.R. Grace, 446 E Supp. at 775; Underwater Storage, 314 F. Supp. 
at 549; Kelsey-Hayes, 15 F.R.D. at 464-65. 
This rationale has been expressed in a variety of metaphors, the most popular being the "bird 
cage" theory of confidentiality-"[Wlhen a secret is out it is out for all time and cannot be 
caught again like a bird and put back in its cage." State v. Bloom, 193 N.Y. 1, 10 (N.Y. 1908). 
Other common characterizations also refer to the horse being out of the barn, Ray v. Cutter Lab., 
746 F. Supp. 86, 88 (M.D. Ha. 1990) (quoting Hamilton v. Hamilton Steel Corp., 409 So. 2d 
11 11, 11 14 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982)), or the rabbit being out of the hat. Marcus, supra note 1, at 
1635. 
34. 15 F.R.D. 461 (E.D. Mich. 1954). 
35. See id. at 462. Interestingly, there is no clear consensus as to which waiver theory the 
case represents. Kelsey-Hayes has been categorized as the "seminal case" on the strict liability 
traditional approach, see Davidson & Voth, supra note 8, at 641, and as representing an early 
example of the conduct, or reasonable precautions, approach, see Meese, supra note 9, at 523; 
Ayres, supra note 8, at 79. This Article views the proper categorization of Kelsey?Hayes as a 
traditional or strict responsibility case. See infra note 40 and accompanying text. 
36. Kelsey-Hayes, 15 F.R.D. at 464. 
37. Id. 
38. Id. 
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confidential com~nunications.~~ The inadvertent nature of the disclosure 
was irrelevant to the court, which ruled that the fact of disclosure 
manifested the intent to disclose, because the defendant took no 
particular care to protect the privileged status of the  document^.^' 
Moreover, relying on the traditional test's second rationale, the court 
reasoned that there was no longer any need for the privilege because the 
plaintiff now knew the contents of the secret cornm~nication.~~ To 
enforce the privilege, would, according to the court, "amount to no more 
than mechanical obedience to a form~la."~' 
2. The Subjective Intent Test 
The subjective intent test is premised on a literal definition of waiver 
as the " 'intentional relinquishment . . . of a known right.' "43 Courts 
embracing this test hold that inadvertent disclosure of privileged matters 
can never operate as a waiver since the client's specific intent to waive 
39. Id. 
40. Id. at 465. It is this mention of the lack of precautions taken that has made some 
commentators view the case as representing a reasonable precaution standard. See, e.g., Meese, 
supra note 9, at 524. However the court's citation to Wigmore, Kelsey-Hayes, 15 F.R.D. at 464, 
who without doubt is the leading advocate of the strict liability approach, makes it clear that the 
case does not represent a reasonable precautions test. 
41. Kekey-Hayes, 15 F.R.D. at 464-65. 
42. Id. at 465. 
43. Mendenhall, 531 F. Supp. at 955 (quoting Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 
(1938)). The Mendenhall court based its definition of waiver on the Johnson court's definition 
of waiver, even though Johnson involved the waiver of a constitutional right. Johnson, 304 U.S. 
at 459, 464. According to the Mendenhall court, "[TJhe same concept applies to waivers 
generally." Mendenhall, 531 F. Supp. at 955 n.9 (citing BLACK'S LAW D I ~ O N A R Y  1417 (5th 
ed. 1979)). 
This linchpin to the subjective intent test has not been without detractors who argue that 
waiver of an evidentiary privilege should be judged by a different standard than waiver of a 
constitutional right because in the former situation, the waiver need not be knowingly made. See 
Transamerica Computer Co. v. International Business Mach. Corp., 573 F.2d 646, 650 (9th Cir. 
1978) (stating that although there may be a difference between waiver of evidentiary privileges 
and constitutional rights, defendant did not waive attorney-client privilege when compelled to 
produce documents); Kanter v. Superior Court, 253 Cal. Rptr. 810, 814 (Ct. App. 1988) 
("Although the privilege is a statutory creation and should be protected and nurtured, it is not 
as sacred as a constitutional right, which should require a knowing and intelligent waiver before 
it is lost."). Recently, the United States Supreme Court in Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 
183 (1990), implied that the Johnson definition of waiver is limited to waiver of criminal trial 
rights. What effect this decision has on the subjective intent test remains to be seen. 
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must be established? This test is the opposite of the traditional test, 
which finds intent solely from the fact of disclosure?' 
The leading subjective intent case is Mendenhall v. Barber-Greene 
C O . ~ ~  Plaintiffs counsel inadvertently allowed opposing counsel to 
review all client files relating to a pending patent infringement case.47 
Four privileged communications were within the files?' When defense 
counsel later requested copies of the communications, plaintiffs counsel 
refused on attorney-client privilege gro~nds?~ Defendants' counsel 
sought to compel produ~tion?~ 
In denying the defendants' motion to produce, the court held that 
"mere inadvertent production does not waive the pri~ilege,"'~ adopting 
the United .States Supreme Court's standard in Johnson v. Zerbst that 
waiver is premised on an " 'intentional relinquishment or abandonment 
of a known right.' "" The court reasoned that inadvertent production 
is antithetical to knowing ~a ive r .5~  
The majority of courts have rejected the subjective intent test on the 
grounds that it is too inflexible." Some courts have criticized the test's 
insistence that waiver must be express since the client's self-interest in 
preserving the privilege may color whether intent to waive exists?' It 
44. See Shriver v. Baskin-Robbins Ice Cream Co., 145 F.R.D. 112, 115 @. Colo. 1992); 
Georgetown Manor, Inc. v. Ethan Allen, Inc., 753 F. Supp. 936, 938 (S.D. Fla. 1991); 
Mendenhall, 531 F. Supp. at 954-55; Pitard v. Stillwater Transfer & Storage Co., 589 So. 2d 
1 127, 1 128-29 (La. Ct. App. 1991). 
45. See, e.g., Underwater Storage, 314 F. Supp. at 549 (stating that the court would not 
look behind the objective fact of production to determine whether the party intended to have the 
letter examined). 
46. 531 F. Supp. at 951. 
47. Id. at 952 n.2. 
48. Id. at 952. 
49. Id. at 952 n.2. 
50. Id. at 952. 
51. Id. at 954. 
52. Id. at 955. 
53. Id. 
54. See Note, supra note 1, at 606 n.31. Many courts have expressly rejected the 
subjective intent test. See, e.g., Kanter, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 814; Dalen v. Ozite Corp., 594 N.E.2d 
1365, 1371-72 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992). Other courts implicitly reject the subjective intent test by 
adopting one of the other tests of waiver. See, e.g., SEC v. O'Brien, No. 91-145,1992 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 18146, at *2-*3 (D.D.C. Aug. 26,1992); In re Grand Jury Investigation, 142 F.R.D. 276, 
279 (M.D.N.C. 1992); Advanced Medical, Inc. v. Arden Medical Sys., Inc., No. 87-3059, 1988 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7297, at *5 (E.D. Pa. July 18, 1988); Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Garvey, 109 
F.R.D. 323,332 (N.D. Cal. 1985). 
55. See Champion Int'l Corp. v. International Paper Co., 486 F. Supp. 1328, 1332 (N.D. 
Ga. 1980); Kanter, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 817 ("Under the subjective approach, a waiver would 
almost never be found. From a practical standpoint, the privilege holder could claim the 
privilege at any time, even long after the party knew that the opposing side had received 
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would be the rare client who, in opposing a motion to produce, or in 
support of a motion for a protective order, states that he intended to 
disclose the documents and waive the pri~ilege.'~ In effect, adopting a 
subjective intent approach gives blanket protection to clients and will 
rarely result in finding waiver based on inadvertent d i sc l~sure .~~  
According to one court, the test can cause instability in a judicial 
proceeding since a party may not know whether the document produced 
will later be allowed into evidence." 
Commentators generally are more receptive to the subjective intent 
test than the courts.59 Some agree with the Mendenhall court's reason- 
ing that waiver must be intentionaL6' Others maintain that the subjec- 
tive intent standard is the most cost-effective, noting that the crucial 
consideration should not be of the producing party's state of mind at the 
time of production, which by definition does not include specific intent 
to disclose, but of his state of mind at the time he is alerted to the 
prod~ction.~' Finally, some commentators, in advocating adoption of 
the subjective intent test, note that some harm does result from a ban on 
the use of inadvertently revealed information because relevant informa- 
tion is suppressed, bui that this harm is outweighed by the privilege's 
benefk6' 
privileged documents."); see also Ayres, supra note 8, at 81-82 ("[Tlhe self-interest of the client 
would raise significant questions concerning the reliability of a client's statement that the 
privilege was not intended to be waived."); WIGMORE, supra note 3, 5 2327, at 636 ("A 
privileged person would seldom be found to waive, if his intention not to abandon could alone 
control the situation."). 
56. See Kanter, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 817. 
57. See id. 
58. See id. (stating that "the privilege holder could claim the privilege at any time"); see 
also Marcus, supra note 1, at 1636 ("[Ilf unintended delivery of privileged material could always 
be taken back . . . there could be continual uncertainty about whether privilege would actually 
be asserted as to items produced in discovery, a prospect that could disrupt trial preparation."). 
Of course, stability alone is not a sufficient rationale for adopting a particular waiver test. Were 
it so, the traditional test would be the test of choice since it is so easy to apply-if documents 
are disclosed, the privilege is waived. See W.R. Grace, 446 F. Supp. at 775 (defining the 
traditional test); supra text accompanying notes 28-3 1. 
59. See, e.g., Meese, supra note 9, at 536; Ayres, supra note 8, at 80-81. 
60. Ayres, supra note 8, at 80. 
61. Meese, supra note 9, at 531. Characterizing the privilege as a type of property right, 
id., the author's analysis appears to be adopted almost fully by the ABA's formal opinion on 
inadvertent disclosure. See infra text accompanying notes 209-12; ABA, supra note 15. 
62. See Marcus, supra note 1, at 1616-17; Meese, supra note 9, at 535. 
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3. The Reasonable Precautions Test 
The reasonable precautions test was conceived as a modern day 
answer to the strict Wigmore-based traditional test.63 Recognizing that 
in sophisticated multi-party litigation with enormous document 
productions, documents do get inadvertently disclosed, the test measures 
intent by examining the disclosing party's conduct and the circumstances 
surrounding the disclosure to determine whether intent to waive 
exists.64 In doing so, the reasonable precautions test replaces bright-line 
approaches, such as those used in the traditional testb5 which measures 
intent by the fact of disclosure, or in the subjective intent testb6 which 
requires that the client's actual intent to waive be e~tablished.'~ This 
totality-of-circumstances approach has evolved into a five-factor analysis 
as first set forth in Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi Strauss & 
C O . ~ ~  
63. See Note, supra note 1, at 616-18 (asserting that a reasonable precautions test is a 
better test of client's intent to maintain confidentiality than stricter tests such as the traditional 
approach). 
64. See id. at 619-23 (describing features common to document production which can help 
courts decide whether reasonable precautions have been taken). 
65. See supra text accompaying notes 28-31. 
66. See supra text accompanying notes 43-44. 
67. The reasonable precautions test may be seen as the natural outgrowth of the earlier 
traditional cases that used the lack of precautions as a means of bolstering their rationale that 
the client could have taken the steps needed to preserve confidentiality. See generally Kelsb- 
Hayes, 15 F.R.D. at 465 (denying privilege existed where client had failed to take adequate 
precautions to keep documents confidential); Underwater Storage, 314 F. Supp. at 549 (stating 
that no attorney-client privilege existed as to letter inadvertently disclosed by attorney). This 
rationale may be the case in singular erroneous disclosure, but is unrealistic in cases where 
thousands, sometimes millions, of documents are produced. See, e.g., Trmamerica, 573 F.2d 
at 648 (describing difficulties in screening for privileged documents, when party is compelled 
to produce approximately 17 million pages). 
68. 104 F.R.D. 103 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). Earlier cases rejected the traditional test in favor of 
a test that evaluated the precautions taken to avoid disclosure, see, e.g., National Helium Corp. 
v. United States, 219 Ct. C1. 612, 614 (1979) (finding only question as to whether the privilege 
attached was whether the procedure followed by the party claiming the privilege was so lax, 
careless or inadequate that the party must be objectively considered as indifferent to disclosure 
to adverse party); Data Sys., Inc. v. Philips Business Sys., Inc., No. 78 Civ.-6015-CSH, at *6 
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 8, 1981) (LEXIS, Genfed Library, DIST File) (rejecting an objective intent test 
and noting that party claiming privilege took every precaution possible to secure privileged 
documents); however, the Lois Sportswear court was the first to articulate the five factor 
approach. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Garvey, 109 F.R.D. 323. 330-31 (N.D. Cal. 1985). 
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(1) The reasonableness of the precautions taken to prevent 
inadvertent disclosure in light of the extent of document produc- 
tiod9 
In considering this factor, the courts look at the mechanics of the 
overall document production and how the accidental disclosure 
occurred.70 This factor requires that the party producing documents 
devise a screening mechanism to cull privileged material.71 The 
complexity of the screening procedure will depend on the number and 
nature of the documents to be prod~ced.~' The courts are also con- 
cerned with the staffing of the screening procedure, with most courts 
requiring that the persons reviewing the material have some legal 
expertise for the courts to find that the procedure was reas~nable .~~ 
69. Lois Sportswear, 104 F.R.D. at 105. 
70. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Invesrigation, 142 F.R.D. at 279-80. 
71. See id.; Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Marine Midland Realty Credit Corp., 138 F.R.D. 
479,483 (E.D. Va. 1991). 
72. See Marine Midland, 138 F.R.D. at 483. The courts consider the amount of documents 
to be produced and the time frame of the production in weighing the adequacy of a screening 
mechanism. See id. For example, the court in Marine Midland held that using only two lawyers 
for one day to review tens of thousands of documents was inadequate. See id. In contrast, 
another court held that the producing party acted reasonably in reviewing 300,000 documents 
over a two-month period under a multi-layer screening procedure staffed by attorneys and 
paralegals that resulted in the inadvertent disclosure of 18 documents. See In re Grand Jury 
Investigation, 142 F.R.D. at 279-80. 
Transamerica describes perhaps one of the most onerous document productions ever 
undertaken. In a previous related action, the district court had ordered defendant, IBM, to 
produce more than 17 million pages of documents within a three-month period. Transamerica, 
573 F.2d at 648. In attempting to meet this deadline, IBM devised an elaborate screening 
mechanism to pull out privileged documents. See id. The screening procedure involved a page- 
by-page initial review of each of the 17 million pages of documents by junior attorneys, 
followed by a tagging process for potentially privileged documents, followed by a another 
review of the tagged items by more senior attorneys, followed by an intricate duplication process 
for partially privileged material. Id. at 649. Despite what the circuit court deemed a "herculean 
effort," id. at 648, 1138 privileged documents were inadvertently disclosed. Id. at 650. The 
plaintiff sought to compel production of the documents, arguing that IBM's previous inadvertent 
disclosure waived the privileged status of the documents. Id. at 647. The lower court denied 
plaintiffs motion to compel production of the documents. Id. In a novel approach to the waiver 
issue, the circuit court avoided deciding whether an inadvertent disclosure waived the privilege 
by holding that the disclosure was compelled by the lower court's onerous discovery schedule, 
and that since the disclosure was not voluntary, it could not amount to a waiver. Id. at 651. No 
later court has used the Transamerica court's theory of compelled disclosure. 
73. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Investigation, 142 F.R.D. at 279 (holding screening 
reasonable when conducted by outside senior and junior attorneys together with a paralegal); 
Chrysler Capital Corp. v. Bankers Trust Co., No. 91 Civ. 5090, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3176, 
at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 17, 1992) (holding that screening was reasonable when conducted by two 
attorneys and a paralegal); Manufacturers & Traders Trust Co. v. Sewotronics, Inc., 522 
Heinonline - -  47 Fla. L. Rev. 172 1995 
19951 INADVERTENT DISCLOSURE OF PRIVILEGED MATERIALS 
(2) The number of inadvertent  disclosure^^^ 
The courts consider the total number of documents produced 
compared to the number of privileged documents inadvertently 
relea~ed.~' The reasonableness of the precautions taken is determined 
in light of the. total document production b~rden.7~ 
(3) The extent of the disclosure77 
The reasonable precautions test considers the extent of the disclo- 
sure?8 Courts treat instances where an adversary has learned the 
contents of a document differently from instances where an adversary 
merely learns of its existence?' As one court noted, 
N.Y.S.2d 999, 1005 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987) ("[Ilf a screener could not reasonably be expected 
to differentiate between privileged and non-privileged documents, the reasonable precaution test 
would not be met. This could occur if counsel delegated the screening function to a paralegal 
or to someone with no legal training."). 
74. Lois Sportswear, 104 F.R.D. at 105. 
75. See, e.g., Parkway Gallery Furniture, Inc. v. Kittinger/Pemsylvania House Group, Inc., 
116 F.R.D. 46.51 (M.D. N.C. 1987). 
76. Compare Kanter, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 819 (holding that 160 privileged documents 
released out of 1600 was unreasonable); Liggett Group Inc. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco 
Corp., 116 F.R.D. 205,207-08 (M.D.N.C. 1986) (releasing several documents out of one box 
of documents deemed unreasonable) and Eigenheim Bank v. Halpern, 598 F. Supp. 988, 991 
(S.D.N.Y. 1984) (disclosing of 1 out of 30 documents deemed unreasonable) with In re Atlantic 
Fin. Fed. Sec. Litig., No. 89-645, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2619, at *21 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 3, 1992) 
(releasing 4 privileged pages out of 50,000 deemed reasonable); Chrysler Capital, 1992 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 2176, at *5 (releasing one small-print document contained in six boxes deemed 
reasonable); In re Grand Jury Investigation, 142 F.R.D. at 280 (releasing 18 documents out of 
300,000 held reasonable); Lois Sportswear, 104 F.R.D. at 5 (releasing 22 documents out of 
16,000 reviewed deemed reasonable); Kansas-Nebraska Natural Gas Co. v. Marathon Oil Co., 
109 F.R.D. 12, 21 (D. Neb. 1984) (releasing 1 document out of 75,000 deemed reasonable). 
77. h i s  Sportswear, 104 F.R.D. at 105. 
78. See id. 
79. Compare Stavanger Prince WS v. MN Joseph Patrick Eckstein, No. 92-0983, 1993 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1610, at *5-*7 (E.D. La. Feb. 10, 1993) (stating that information in a 
privileged letter known to one adverse party should in fairness be known to all adverse parties); 
Marine Midland, 138 F.R.D. at 483 (finding waivers where the documents' entire contents are 
known); Kanter, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 820 (noting that plaintiff had actually incorporated the 
privileged document into his trial strategy) with In re Grand Jury Investigation, 142 F.R.D. at 
281 (finding that since documents did not reach the grand jury, confidentiality could be restored 
and privilege invoked); Chubb Integrated Sys. Ltd. v. National Bank of Wash., 103 F.R.D. 52, 
63 (D.D.C. 1984) (stating that the mere fact that the adverse party had an opportunity to open 
a file drawer cannot constitute a disclosure of privileged information); Ranney-Brown Distrib., 
Inc. v. E.T. Barwick Indus., Inc., 75 F.R.D. 3, 6 (S.D. Ohio 1977) (finding no waivers where 
disclosure was limited to glancing at documents or merely designating them for copying). 
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A limited disclosure resulting from glancing at an open file 
drawer or designating documents for copying may not 
justify a finding of waiver when the party does not know 
the essence of the document's contents. However, when 
disclosure is complete, a court order cannot restore confi- 
dentialit and, at best, can only attempt to restrain further 
erosion. X 
Thus, when the inadvertent disclosure reveals all, the courts have a 
greater tendency to find waiver.81 
(4) Promptness of response82 
A party's prompt attempt to reclaim or block the use of inadvertently 
disclosed materials is critical in ascertaining the intent to waive under 
the reasonable precautions test.83 Response time is the interval between 
knowledge of the breach in confidentiality and the request for relief, 
normally in the form of a motion for a protective order.84 Courts are 
more reluctant to find a waiver of the attorney client privilege when the 
attorney moves promptly for reliefY8' than when attorneys know that the 
adversary is in possession of privileged documents and do nothing for 
an extended period.86 The promptness of the response is inversely 
related to the level of reliance the adversary may claim it has in the 
disputed materials. While the courts generally consider reliance in the 
final, overall fairness it is necessarily tied into the promptness 
factor. 
80. Parkway Gallery, 116 F.R.D. at 51-52 (citations omitted). 
81. See, e.g., Golden Valley Microwave Foods, Inc. v. Weaver Popcorn Co., 132 F.R.D. 
204,209 (N.D. Ind. 1990); Marine Midland, 138 F.R.D. at 483; In re Grand Jury Investigation 
of Ocean Transp., 604 F.2d 672, 675 ( D.C. Cir.), cert. denied sub nom., Sea-Land Serv., Inc. 
v. United States, 444 U.S. 915 (1979). 
82. Lois Sportswear, 104 F.R.D. at 105. 
83. See, e.g., Manufacturers & Traders, 522 N.Y.S.2d at 1005. 
84. See id. 
85. See, e.g., Magnavox Co. v. Bally Midway Mfg. Co., No. 83 C 2357, at 4 (N.D. Ill. 
Nov. 5, 1984) (LEXIS, Genfed Library, DIST File) (noting the promptness of the objection); 
Manufacturers & Traders, 522 N.Y.S.2d at 1005 (noting that a protective order was sought two 
business days after the inadvertent disclosure was discovered). 
86. See, e.g., In re Conticommodity Servs., Inc., No. 644, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10358, 
at *4 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 9, 1988) (two month delay); Kanter, 253 Cal. Rptr..at 820 (15-month 
delay); cf: In re Grand Jury Investigation of Ocean Transp., 604 F.2d at 674-75 (using 
traditional test of waiver but noting the party's 15-month delay in seeking relief). 
87. Kanter, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 820. 
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(5) Overall fairnesss8 
Overall fairness is a final catch-all factor the courts use in determin- 
ing whether a party took reasonable  precaution^.'^ This factor looks 
mainly to see if there are any special circumstances that justify 
preserving the privilege, or vice versa, justify finding a waiver.g0 A 
recipient's reliance on the privileged materials is considered a special 
circumstance?' Thus, if the adversary has used the privileged docu- 
ments as a cornerstone of its litigation or discovery strategy, the courts 
are less likely to uphold the privilege, particularly if the producing 
attorney had the opportunity to object to such use?' 
Some commentators have criticized the five-factor analysis on the 
grounds that it does not provide guidance in setting a standard of 
reasonable care and that a case-by-case approach produces unpredictable 
re~u1t.s.~~ Another criticism is that the test favors large f m  practices 
that have the means to create elaborate screening procedures to the 
detriment of the solo pra~titioner.'~ Notwithstanding these criticisms, 
the judiciary is using the reasonable precautions test in growing 
numbers?' Many commentators, however, recognize the benefits of the 
case-by-case appr~ach?~ 
88. Lois Sportswear, 104 F.R.D. at 105. 
89. Parkway Gallery, 116 F.R.D. at 50; Lois Sportswear, 104 F.R.D. at 105; Kanter, 253 
Cal. Rptr. at 818, 820; Manufacturers & Traders, 522 N.Y.S.2d at 1004. 
90. See, e.g., Parkway Gallery, 116 F.R.D. at 52. 
91. See, e.g., Manufacturers & Traders, 522 N.Y.S.2d at 1005. 
92. See, e.g., Grand Jury Investigation of Ocean Tramp., 604 F.2d at 675. One 
commentator has suggested that reliance is an inappropriate criterion because the recipient is in 
a much better position than the sender to know whether a document was inadvertently produced 
and that notification to the producing party will preclude reliance. Meese, supra note 9, at 535. 
This analysis does not place the proper emphasis on attorney responsibility. Situations exist 
where a party may intentionally reveal privileged materials as part of a litigation or settlement 
strategy. See Marcus, supra note 1, at 1633. The receiving party should not bear the 
responsibility of ensuring that his or her adversary meant to make the disclosures. Moreover, 
instances exist where it is not clear that a document is privileged. See, e.g.. International 
Business Mach. Corp. v. Comdisco, Inc., No. 91-C-07-199,1992 Del. Super. LEXIS 255, at *1- 
*3 (Del. Super. Ct. June 22, 1992). One can easily see how there may be reliance made upon 
a document which is later discovered to be privileged. 
93. See Harding, supra note 9, at 502-03; Lanin, supra note 8, at 756-59; Meese, supra 
note 9, at 538-42; Ayres, supra note 8, at 79-80. 
94. See Lanin, supra note 8, at 758; A. Leo Levin & Denise D. Colliers, Containing the 
Cost of litigation, 37 RUTGERS L. REV. 219,227-29 (1985); Marcus, supra note 1, at 1608-13. 
95. See Meese, supra note 9, at 523-24; Harding, supra note 9, at 473-74; Ayres, supra 
note 8, at 79. 
96. See, e.g., Grippando, supra note 8, at 524-25; Note, supra note 1, at 619-24. 
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4. ABA Formal Opinion 92-368 
In response to a situation that arose in a complex asbestos litigation, 
when a temporary secretary mistakenly sent a copy of the defendants' 
jury selection strategy to plaintiff's counsel, the ABA issued its first 
formal opinion on the issue of inadvertent d i sc los~re .~~  The opinion 
begins with a blanket statement that 
[a] lawyer who receives materials that on their face appear 
to be subject to the attorney-client privilege or otherwise 
confidential, under circumstances where it is clear they 
were not intended for the receiving lawyer, should refrain 
from examining the materials, notify the sending law er and 
abide the instructions of the lawyer who sent them. x 
The opinion relies on two areas of law in support of its conclusion 
that inadvertently produced materials should be returned: attorney-client 
privilege and bailment.99 As to the first area of law, the opinion notes 
that the majority of cases concerning waiver of the attorney-client 
privilege hold that mere inadvertence is insufficient to waive the 
privilege.Io0 In so doing, the opinion dismisses the Wigmorian rule''' 
that any disclosure should be deemed a waiver.''' What is less clear 
is whether the opinion more closely aligns itself with the subjective 
intent test or with the reasonable precautions test.Io3 While the opinion 
may be read as adopting the subjective intent test,"" it also appears to 
be endorsing a reasonable precautions standard.''' For instance, the 
opinion makes only passing reference to what it labels as a "minority" 
rule established by the Mendenhall court.'06 Had it been the ABA's 
intent to adopt a pure subjective intent test, it would not have relegated 
the seminal case to a mere footnote. Additionally, it cites with approval 
cases employing the reasonable precautions test.'07 
97. See Cornelia H. Tuite, Missent Information Pits Ethics Against Evidence, CHI. DAILY 
L. BULL., Apr. 2, 1993, at 6. 
98. ABA, supra note 15, at 1001:156. 
99. Id. at 1001:155-60. 
100. Id. at 1001:158. 
101. WIGMORE, supra note 3, $ 2325, at 632. 
102. See ABA, supra note 15, at 1001:158-59. 
103. See Tuite, supra note 97, at 6. 
104. Id. 
105. See ABA, supra note 15, at 1001:158-59. 
106. Id. at 1001:158 n.3. 
107. Id. at 1001:158. 
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Property law is the second basis upon which the ABA rested its 
conclusion that clearly erroneous transmittals should be returned.Io8 
According to the ABA opinion, the recipient is the constructive bailee 
of the sender's property, here the document and the ideas contained 
within it,Io9 and therefore has a legal duty to return the document or 
be faced with a conversion claim against it."' The ABA opinion notes 
that there is "no rule of universal applicationyy as the right of the bailee 
to use the bailed property,"' but acknowledges that one test to deter- 
mine allowable usage by the bailee is whether "the consent of the owner 
to the use may be fairly pre~umed.""~ According to the ABA, in the 
situation before it, the sending attorney could have only consented to the 
return of the missent do~ument."~ The ABA opinion thus appears to 
create a presumption against waiver that the receiving party must 
rebut.l14 Here too, however, the opinion may be read as supporting a 
reasonable precautions test because that is the standard typically 
employed in other areas of property law involving confidential 
 communication^.^^^ 
108. Id. at 1W1:159. Bailment has been defined as "the rightful possession of goods by one 
who is not the owner." 9 SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRA~S 5 1030 
(3d ed. 1957). There is usually an express or implied contract noting that the property will be 
returned or accounted for when the purpose of the bailment has been accomplished. 8 AM. JUR. 
2D Bailments 8 2 (1980). The bailee's right to use bailed property is governed by the 
circumstances surrounding the bailment and the nature of the transfer of the property. Id. 8 207. 
Again the question becomes how the recipient should know that the materials he received were 
, 
clearly not meant for him. Id. In the situation that the ABA was addressing, it would be clear 
to any reasonable person that the secretary erred. However, this is not always the case. See supra 
note 92. 
109. Whether one may consider the information and ideas contained in a privileged 
document as property, separate and apart from the physical page on which they are contained, 
raises interesting issues. A detailed examination of these issues is beyond the scope of this 
Article. 
110. ABA, supra note 15, at 1001:159. 
111. Id. at 1001:159-60. 
112. Id. at 1001:160 (quoting 8 AM. JUR. 2D Baflments 8 207 (1980) (emphasis omitted)). 
113. Id. 
114. The opinion also notes that good sense and reciprocity are reasons for returning a 
missent document. Id. at 1001:161. It discounted the competing ethical obligation of zealous 
representation by stating that limitations exist on the extent to which a lawyer may go "all out" 
for the client. Id. at 1001:157. For example, it noted that a lawyer may not view files or notes 
that an adversary leaves out during a break in a deposition, or that an adversary inadvertently 
leaves after a closing. Id. at 1001:160-61. 
115. See, e.g., infra notes 224-27 and accompanying text. 
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11. THE LEGAL AND THE ETHICAL RESPONSES TO 
CONFIDENTIALITY: THE A'ITORNEY-CLIENT 
PRIVILEGE AND THE ETHICAL DUTY TO 
MAINTAIN CLIENT CONFIDENCES 
Most courts and commentators have deemed that a client's ability to 
engage in unfettered consultation with his attorney is so beneficial to 
society that it overrides any specific concerns that shielding information 
hinders the truth-seeking function of our adversarial system.Il6 Attor- 
116. See, e.g., Meese, supra note 9, at 535. As the United States Supreme Court stated in 
Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980), "[tlhe lawyer-client privilege rests on the 
need for the advocate and counselor to know all that relates to the client's reasons for seeking 
representation if the professional mission is to be carried out." See also Chirac v. Reinicker, 24 
U.S. (1 1 Wheat.) 280, 294 (1826) (stating that the attorney-client privilege is "indispensable for 
the purposes of private justice"); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., An Historical Perspective on the 
Attorney-Client Privilege, 66 CAL. L. REV. 1061, 1062 (1978) ("[Ihe issue concerning the 
attorney-client privilege is not whether it should exist, but precisely what its terms should be."); 
Note, The Attorney-Client Privilege and the Corporate Client: Where Do We Go Ajier Upjohn?, 
81 MICH. L. REV. 665,666 n.5 (1983) (stating that almost no one seriously advocates abolishing 
the privilege). 
Courts and commentators have set out a number of theories behind the attorney-client 
privilege, with a cost-benefit analysis as most prevalent. See Meese, supra note 9, at 515-18; 
Developments in the Law-Privileged Communications: III. Attorney-Client Privilege, 98 HARV. 
L. REV. 1501, 15Dl-04 (1985) [hereinafter Attorney-Client Privilege]. This cost-benefit analysis 
weighs the costs of protecting from view materials that may have bearing on the truth of the 
controversy against the less tangible societal benefits, such as inducing clients to consult freely 
with their attorneys to determine the legality of proposed acts, and to help a client through the 
mire of the legal system once he is involved in litigation. See id. at 1502-03. According to a 
cost-benefit analysis, the privilege hinders the truth-seeking function of litigation by shielding 
evidence. See MARVIN E. FRANKEL, PARTISAN JUSTICE 64-65 (1980); Marvin E. Frankel, The 
Search for Truth Continued: More Disclosure, Less Privilege, 54 U. COLO. L. REV. 51, 65 
(1982). However, as the courts and commentators have pointed out, without the privilege the 
communication would not have been made in the first place, so there is no net cost. See, e.g., 
Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 395 (1981) ("Application of the attorney-client 
privilege . . . puts the adversary in no worse position than if the communications had never 
taken place."); Meese, supra note 9, at 518-19. Commentators have stressed the benefits of 
encouraging unfettered discussions between lawyer and client. See, e.g., David A. Nelson, 
Comment, Attorney-Client Privilege and Procedural Safeguards: Are They Worth the Costs?, 
86 Nw. U. L. REV. 368, 384 (1992) (stating that the confidential forum provided by the 
attorney-client privilege allows the attorney to provide sound legal advice). The privilege, in 
encouraging the client to be honest with his attorney, promotes the ability of the lawyer to give 
the client fully informed legal advice. See id. If the client does not discuss matters with such 
frankness, the ability of the attorney to offer legal advice is impaired. See Albert W. Alschuler, 
The Preservation of a Client's Confidences: 'one Value Among Many or a Categorical 
Imperative?, 52 U. COLO. L. REV. 349, 352 (1981). Another benefit of the privilege is that it 
encourages compliance with the law. See Davidson & Voth, supra note 8, at 638 ('"The attorney 
to whom confidences are freely expressed has a greater opportunity to learn of and counsel 
against potentially unlawful conduct."). 
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ney and client communications are protected by two sets of rules. The 
courts and legislatures have defined the attorney-client privilege, which 
protects the client's confidential materials from forced disclosure within 
a legal proceeding.ll7 The ABA has promulgated the Model Rules of 
A strict utilitarian analysis notes only systemic benefits, rather than consideri;lg the benefits 
that may occur in a particular litigation. Attorney-Client Privilege, supra, at 1505-06. Non- 
utilitarian theories of the purposes of the attorney-client privilege stress the client's personal 
autonomy and privacy rights. See, e.g., Alschuler, supra, at 350-52. See generally Attorney- 
Client Privilege, supra, at 1501-04 (examining the history and rationales for the utilitarian and 
non-utilitarian approaches). Non-utilitarians hold the disclosure of privileged communications 
as intrinsically wrong notwithstanding any specific truth-seeking benefits the disclosure may 
produce in the underlying litigation. Id. 
A "full" utilitarian analysis would take into account non-utilitarian benefits in the cost- - 
benefit analysis, such as the client's right to know the law and to have an attorney act as his 
representative. See id. at 1504. 
117. WIGMORE, supra note 3 , s  2292, at 558-59. For citations to typical statutes, see supra 
note 17. The attorney-client privilege has been called the "oldest of the privileges for 
confidential communications known to the common law." See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389. The 
common law origins of the attorney-client privilege appear to be in the late sixteenth century. 
Developments in the Law-Privileged Communications: I. Introduction, The History of 
Evidentiary Privileges in American Lm, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1454, 1456 (1985). Historians have 
posited at least two justifications for the initial adoption of the privilege. The first possibility is 
that it developed as an extension of the right against self-incrimination. Attorney-Client 
Privilege, supra note 116, at 1501-02 (quoting 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES * 370 
(" '[Nlo counsel, attorney, or other person, intrusted with the secrets of the cause by the party 
himself, shall be compelled, or perhaps allowed, to give evidence of such conversation or 
matters of privacy, as came to his knowledge by virtue of such trust and confidence.' ")). A 
second theory behind the initial adoption of the privilege is that it protected the lawyer whose 
oath of loyalty to his client would be breached if he were forced to divulge his client's 
confidences. See WIGMORE, supra note 3, $2290, at 543. One commentator has noted that both 
of these initial justifications are non-utilitarian. See Attorney-Client Privilege, supra note 116, 
at 1502. 
Distinct from the attorney-client privilege is the work-product doctrine. The landmark case 
of Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947), created an exception to the otherwise broad federal 
discovery rules to protect an attorney's work-product. Under the work-product doctrine, 
information gathered by an attorney in preparation for litigation is protected from discovery 
requests, unless the opposing counsel demonstrates a need for its disclosure. Id. at 512. 1n 
addition to Hickman, federal courts abide by the work product rule articulated in the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, which protects against disclosure of "the mental impressions, 
conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney or other representative of a party 
concerning the litigation." FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3). 
The work product doctrine reflects a policy that attorneys should be free to investigate all 
aspects of his client's case and devise strategy and tactics without the fear that such information 
can be obtained by opposing counsel through discovery. See Hickman, 329 U.S. at 512-13. A 
split of authority exists as to whether the work-product doctrine should be treated the same as 
the attorney-client privilege for waiver purposes. See Chubb Integrated Sys. Ltd. v. National 
Bank of Wash., 103 F.R.D. 52, 63 (D.D.C. 1984) ('There is a difference of opinion . . . on 
whether the concept of [implied waiver] applies only to attorney-client communications, or to 
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Professional Conduct that impose ethical obligations on attorneys to 
maintain their clients' confidences."' Both mechanisms encourage 
work-product as well."). A number of courts have held that waiver of work-product immunity 
requires more than the disclosure of confidential information; the disclosure must be 
"inconsistent with the adversary system." See, e.g., id.; Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Garvey, 109 
F.R.D. 323, 328 (N.D. Calif. 1985). 
118. See MODEL RULES, supra note 5, Rule 1.6. Rule 1.6(a) states: "A lawyer shall not 
reveal information relating to representation of a client unless the client consents after 
consultation, except for disclosures that are impliedly authorized in order to carry out the 
representation." 
Originally, the ABA's Canons of Ethics, as enacted in 1928, required the lawyer to preserve 
a client's confidences. See HERSCHEL W. ARANT, CASES AND OTHER MATERIALS ON THE 
AMERICAN BAR AND ITS ETHICS app. at 647 n.1, 658 (1933). However, it offered no definition 
of "confidences." See id. app. at 658. The Code of Professional Responsibility extends the 
protection of attorney-client communications beyond those communications protected by the 
attorney-client privilege. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND CODE OF 
JUDICIAL CONDUCT DR 4-101 (1986) [hereinafter MODEL CODE]. Abandoning the "confidences" 
used in the Canons of Ethics, the Model Code instead protects not only information protected 
by the attorney-client privilege, but also secrets, which are defined as "information gained in the 
professional relationship that the client has requested be held inviolate or the disclosure of which 
would be embarrassing or would be likely to be detrimental to the client." See id. 
In 1977, the ABA appointed a commission to recommend changes to the Code. Robert W. 
Meserve, Introduction to ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT 4 (2d ed. 
1992). Chaired by attorney Robert Kutak, it became known as the Kutak Commission. Hany I. 
Subin, The Lawyer as Superego: Disclosure of Client Confdences to Prevent Harm, 70 IOWA 
L. REV. 1091, 1105 n.81 (1985). The Commission proposed that attorneys be compelled to 
disclose confidences to prevent death or serious bodily harm, to protect the court and parties 
from false evidence, and to prevent unfair advantage by a client through fraud. Id. These 
proposals were soundly rejected by the ABA membership. Id. Instead, the ABA adopted the 
Model Rules Rule 1.6, its most extensive rule of confidentiality yet formulated. See MODEL 
RULES, supra note 5, Rule 1.6 (stating under which particular circumstances confidential 
information may be revealed). Rule 1.6(b) does not compel disclosure in the circumstances 
articulated by the Kutak Commission. See id. See generally Subin, supra, at 1090 (advocating 
that the attorney-client privilege and the ethical rules be reconciled and problems should be 
resolved by applying a standard set of principles). Instead, it limits the attorney's ability to 
disclose client confidences without the client's consent to the following instances: 
A lawyer may reveal such information to the extent the lawyer reasonably 
believes necessary: (1) to prevent the client from committing a criminal act that the 
lawyer believes is likely to result in imminent death or substantial bodily harm; or 
(2) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy between 
the lawyer and the client, to establish a defense to a criminal charge or civil claim 
against the lawyer based upon conduct in which the client was involved, or to 
respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning the lawyer's representation of 
the client. 
MODEL RULES, supra note 5, Rule 1.6(b). 
Rule 1.6 does not require disclosure under these circumstances; the attorney has the option 
to disclose or not. See id. In contrast, under the Model Code, an attorney may reveal: 
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frank communication, but have differences which create tension between 
them, particularly in the area of inadvertent disclosure. 
A. Similarities 
Rule 1.6 of the ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct states that, 
"[a] lawyer shall not reveal information relating to representation of a 
client unless the client  consent^.""^ The attorney-client privilege 
similarly prohibits forced disclosure of privileged matters.I2" 
The similarity between the attorney's ethical obligation of confidenti- 
ality and the attorney-client privilege is the goal of ensuring that the 
client is free to safely share confidences with his attorney.'" Both 
imply the need for attorneys to be able to give sound advice based on 
full knowledge of the  circumstance^.'^ The Supreme Court in Upjohn 
Co. v. United States,'= a landmark case on the attorney-client privi- 
lege,'24 recognized the parallel justifications between the attorney- 
(1) Confidences or secrets with the consent of the client or clients affected, but 
only after a full disclosure to them. 
(2) Confidences or secrets when permitted under Disciplinary Rules or required by 
. law or court order. 
(3) The intention of his client to commit a crime and the information necessary to 
prevent the crime. 
(4) Confidences or secrets necessary to establish or collect his fee or to defend 
himself or his employees or associates against an accusation of wrongful conduct. 
MODEL CODE, supra, DR 4-101 (footnotes omitted). 
The judicially created crime-fraud exception is another exemption to the rule of confidentiali- 
ty. See In re Grand Jury Investigation, 842 F.2d 1223, 1226 (11th Cir. 1987). A client who 
confers with his attorney with the intent to further a crime or fraud may not have his 
communications with his attorney protected. See United States v. Laurins, 857 F.2d 529, 540 
(9th Cir. 1988); In re Grand Jury Investigation, 842 F.2d at 1226. 
119. MODEL RULES, supra note 5, Rule 1.6(a). 
120. See supra note 3 for a standard working definition of the attorney-client privilege. 
121. See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389; supra note 116; MODEL RULES, supra note 5, Rule 1.6 
cmt. [2]. 
122. See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389; MODEL RULES, supra note 5, Rule 1.6 cmt. [3]. 
123. 449 U.S. at 383. 
124. In Upjohn, general counsel of Upjohn Pharmaceutical conducted an in-house 
investigation of questionable payments made by Upjohn subsidiaries to foreign government 
officials. Id. at 386. The investigation included a confidential and detailed questionnaire 
distributed to several officials in Upjohn to ascertain the legal implications of the payments and 
follow-up interviews of some officials. Id. at 386-87. After Upjohn voluntarily informed the 
Securities and Exchange Commission and the Internal Revenue Service (I.R.S.) of the possible 
existence of such payments, the I.R.S. issued a summons demanding production of the 
questionnaire, memoranda, and notes of the follow-up interviews. Id. at 387-88. Upjohn 
declined, and both the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan and the 
Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the summons should be enforced, although for 
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client privilege and the ethical duty of c~nfidentiality.'~~ The opinion 
concerned the scope of the attorney-client privilege in the corporate 
setting.'26 In addition to stating unequivocally that the attorney-client 
privilege serves systemic goals of promoting the fair and just observance 
and administration of law,'" the court commented on the ethical 
obligations imposed by the ABA.lZ8 It noted that the " 'ethical obliga- 
tion of a lawyer to hold inviolate the confidences and secrets of his 
client not only facilitates the full development of facts essential to 
proper representation of the client but also encourages laymen to seek 
early legal assistance. 9 ,9129 
B. Differences 
Notwithstanding the similarities between the attorney-client privilege 
and the ethical obligation to maintain confidentiality, significant 
differences exist between the two. The prohibition against disclosure 
contained in Model Rule 1.6 is broader than the protection provided by 
the attorney-client privilege. Rule 1.6 extends protection to all informa- 
tion relating to a client's representation whatever its source, including 
non-confidential matters, while the attorney-client privilege covers only 
a client's communications made in confidence for the purpose of 
different reasons. Id. at 388. On grant of certiorari, the Supreme Court held that such 
information was protected by the attorney-client privilege. Id. at 386. In his opinion, Justice 
Rehnquist articulated the dual rationale for the attorney-client privilege: 
[The] purpose [of the privilege] is to encourage full and frank communication 
between attorneys and their clients and thereby promote broader public interests in 
the observance of law and administration of justice. The privilege recognizes that 
sound legal advice or advocacy serves public ends and that such advice or 
advocacy depends upon the lawyer's being fully informed by the client. 
Id. at 389. 
The holding in Upjohn and its implications have been closely examined. See, e.g., Marcus, 
supra note 1, at 1620-22; Stephen A. Saltzburg, Corporate and RelatedAttorney-Client Privilege 
Claims: A Suggested Approach, 12 HOFSTRA L. REV. 279, 291-95 (1983); John E. Sexton, A 
Post-Upjohn Consideration of Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege, 57 N.Y.U. L. REV. 443,456- 
73 (1982); Michael L. Waldman, Beyond Upjohn: The Attorney-Client Privilege in the Corporate 
Context, 28 WM. & MARY L. REV. 473,487-500 (1987); Marshall Williams, The Scope of the 
Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege in View of Reason and Experience, 25 HOW. L.J. 425.450- 
57 (1982). 
125. See Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 391. 
126. See id. at 389-90. 
127. Id. at 389. 
128. Id. at 391. 
129. Id. (quoting MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 4-1 (1980)). 
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obtaining legal advice.I3' Thus, an attorney's ethical obligations would 
prohibit him from revealing any information he knew about or had 
obtained from a person before he was retained, while the attorney-client 
privilege extends only to information gathered in confidence for the 
purposes of representation. Another distinguishing feature is that, unlike 
the attorney-client privilege which applies only in judicial or other 
proceedings,13' the rule of confidentiality applies in situations "other 
than those where evidence is sought from the lawyer through compul- 
sion of law."'32 
In addition to the specific differences noted above, both differ in 
their philosophical underpinnings. Because the attorney-client privilege 
may operate as an information suppressor, many courts have held that 
it must be narrowly construed,133 and that it is easily waived.'34 Dean 
130. Compare WIGMORE, supra note 3, $2292, at 554 (stating that communications to legal 
advisor made in confidence to obtain legal'advice is privileged under the attorney client 
privilege) with MODEL RULES, supra note 5, Rule 1.6 cmt. [5] ('"The confidentiality rule applies 
not merely to matters communicated in confidence by the client but also to all information 
relating to the representation, whatever its source."). 
Thus under the Model Rules, all information relating to the representation is deemed covered 
by the duty of confidentiality, without regard to whether it was gained in the professional 
relationship. Id. Also, Rule 1.6 requires confidentiality of information relating to representation, 
even if it was acquired before or after the professional relationship existed. See id. 
The comments to Model Code EC 4-4 reflect the broader reach of ethical responsibilities 
compared to the attorney-client privilege: "The attorney-client privilege is more limited than the 
ethical obligation of a lawyer to guard the confidences and secrets of his client. This ethical 
precept, unlike the evidentiary privilege, exists without regard to the nature or source of 
information or the fact that others share the knowledge." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL 
RE~PONSIBIL~W EC 4-4 (1986). In short, much information which is ethically protected will not 
be privileged, but nearly all information protected under the privilege will also be ethically 
protected. See STEPHEN GILLERS, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: PROBLEMS OF LAW AND ETHICS 
17 (3d ed. 1992). 
131. MODEL RULES, supra note 5, Rule 1.6 cmt. [5]. 
132.. Id. 
133. See, e.g., Suburban Sew 'N Sweep, Inc. v. Swiss-Bernina, Inc., 91 F.R.D. 254, 257 
(N.D. Ill. 1981) ("A court must balance the possibility that the privilege indirectly promotes free 
and honest communication with the policy of liberal discovery to enhance the search for truth. 
For these reasons, the privilege must be strictly construed."); Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n of 
Am. v. Shamrock Broadcasting Co., 521 F. Supp. 638,641 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (stating that because 
the privilege covers materials which would otherwise be discoverable, the privilege should be 
narrowly construed); Underwater Storage, Inc. v. United States Rubber Co., 314 E Supp. 546, 
547 (D.D.C. 1970) (stating that the privilege has such an effect on the full disclosure of the truth 
that it should be narrowly construed). 
The courts' narrow construction of the attorney-client privilege reflects the American legal 
system's philosophy of broad discovery. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure embody the 
philosophy of broad discovery. The Federal Rules were adopted in 1938 pursuant to 
congressional grant of power to the Supreme Court to promulgate rules of civil procedure. See 
Act of June 19, 1934, ch. 651,48 Stat. 1064 (codified at 28 U.S.C. 5 2072 (1994)). The original 
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Rules and subsequent amendments were designed to encourage the availability of information 
that was to be disclosed prior to trial. CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE 5 2001-2002, at 13-22 (1994); see FED. R. CIV. P. 26-37 advisory committee's 
notes. Congress' goal in enacting the Rules was to facilitate " 'an orderly search for the truth 
in the interest of justice rather than a contest between two legal gladiators with surprise and 
technicalities as their chief weapons.' " Paul R. Sugarman & Marc G. Perlin, Proposed Changes 
to Discovery Rules in Aid of "Tort Reform": Has the Case Been Made?, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 
1465, 1490 (1993) (quoting ARTHUR T. VANDERBILT, CASES AND OTHER MATERIALS ON 
MODERN PROCEDURE AND JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 10 (1952)). 
The changes to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that went into effect on December 1, 
1993, exemplify judicial and legislative concern for broad discovery. See FED. R. CIV. P. 26 
advisory committee's note. The 1970 amendment to Rule 26 provided for broad discovery by 
stating that "[plarties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is 
relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action." WRIGHT ET AL., supra, at 21. The 
Advisory Committee note to Rule 26 state that under the Federal Rules, "court[s] must be 
careful not to deprive a party of discovery that is reasonably necessary to afford a fair 
opportunity to develop and prepare the case." FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee's note to 
the 1983 Amendment. Before and after the Rule 26 amendments, courts have liberally construed 
Rule 26 in order to provide both parties with information essential to proper litigation on all the 
facts. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495,506-07 (1947); Young v. Lukens Steel Co., NO. 92- 
6490, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1462, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 10,1994); Robbins v. Camden City Bd. 
of Educ., 105 F.R.D. 49,55 (D.N.J. 1985); Mitsui & Co. v. Puerto Rico Water Resources Auth., 
79 F.R.D. 72, 80 (D.P.R. 1978); Mallinckrodt Chem. Works v. Goldman, Sachs & Co., 58 
F.R.D. 348, 352-53 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Patton v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 38 F.R.D. 428, 
429 (N.D. Ga. 1965). One court stated that "[tlhe basic philosophy of the present federal 
procedure is that prior to trial every party to a civil action is entitled to the disclosure of all 
relevant information in the possession of any person, unless the information is privileged." 
Donovan v. Prestamos Presto Puerto Rico, Inc., 91 F.R.D. 222, 223 (D.P.R. 1981). 
With the 1993 Amendments, liberal discovery is not only encouraged, it is mandated. See 
FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee's note to 1993 Amendment. Rule 26 now provides for 
automatic disclosure of certain information even before a discovery request is made. FED. R. 
CIV. P. 26. The Rule provides: 
(a) REQUIRED DISCLOSURES; M ~ O D S  TO DISCOVER ADDITIONAL MATIER 
(1) Initial Disclosures. Except to the extent otherwise stipulated or directed 
by order or local rule, a party shall, without awaiting a discovery request, 
provide to other parties: 
(A) the name and, if known, the address and telephone number of each 
individual likely to have discoverable information relevant to disputed facts 
alleged with particularity in the pleadings, identifying the subjects of the 
information; 
(B) a copy of, or a description by category and location of, all documents, 
data compilations, and tangible things in the possession, custody, or control of 
the party that are relevant to disputed facts alleged with particularity in the 
pleadings. 
FED. R. CIV. P. 26. 
Justice Scalia's dissent from the Court's approval of the amended rules was based, in part, 
on what he saw as the "intolerable strain upon lawyers' ethical duty to represent their clients and 
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Wigmore noted that the privilege's "benefits are all indirect and 
speculative; its obstruction is plain and concrete . . . . It is worth 
preserving for the sake of a general policy, but it is nonetheless an 
obstacle to the investigation of the truth."13' 
In contrast to the narrow view of privilege adopted by some courts, 
the ABA takes a much more expansive approach to the duty to maintain 
~0nfidentiality.I~~ An ABA's formal opinion has noted that the rules 
governing a lawyer's professional conduct, "reflect a far more positive 
view toward the importance of maintaining the confidentiality of 
attorney-client communications" than does the attorney-client privi- 
lege.137 Thus, despite the complementary nature of the two bodies of 
law,I3' the development of separate legal devices addressing client 
confidences has created the potential for conflict between the attorney- 
client privilege and the ethical duties of an attorney to maintain 
c~nfidences.'~~ 
This conflict is especially apparent in the area of inadvertent 
disclosures, particularly in light of the ABA's only formal opinion on 
the topic which may be construed as calling for a blanket rule requiring 
inadvertently disclosed materials to be returned.lN Therefore, an 
attorney may be put in a situation where he has violated an ABA rule 
not to assist the opposing side" that is caused by mandating automatic discovery. Amendments 
to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 507, 51 1 (1993) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). A similar concern may be raised by requiring that the recipient of inadvertently 
disclosed privileged materials return them. See infa note 142 and accompanying text. 
134. See, e.g., Weil v. Investmentfindicators, Research & Management, Inc., 647 F.2d 18, 
24 (9th Cir. 1981) (" '[ilnadvertence' of disclosure does not as a matter of law prevent the 
occurrence of waiver' "); Advanced Medical, Inc. v. Arden Medical Sys., Inc., No. 87-3059, 
1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7297, at *5 (E.D. Pa. July 18, 1988) ("Inadvertent disclosure of an 
otherwise privileged document does not as a matter of law preclude a finding of waiver."); 
Underwater Storage, 314 F. Supp. at 549 ("Once the document was produced for inspection, it 
entered the public domain."). 
Not all courts are resistant to upholding the attorney-client privilege and to minimizing the 
waiver doctrine. Courts embracing the subjective intent test view the privilege as supreme. See, 
e.g., Mendenhall v. Barber-Greene Co., 531 F. Supp. 951, 955 (N.D. 111. 1982). 
135. WIGMORE, supra note 3, $ 2291, at 554; see also Teachers Ins., 521 F. Supp. at 641 
("mhe privilege covers materials which otherwise would be discoverable. . . ."); United States 
v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357,358 @. Mass. 1950) (stating that the privilege 
can result in the suppression of evidence). 
136. See supra notes 118, 130 and accompanying text. 
137. ABA, supra note 15, at 1001:159. 
138. See id. at 1001:158. 
139. See supra notes 117,118 and accompanying text for a discussion of the privilege rule 
and ethical duty to maintain confidentiality; and supra note 5 for a discussion of the related 
ethical obligation to zealously represent one's client, which is implicated in the inadvertent 
disclosure arena. 
140. See ABA, supra note 15, at 1001: 155. 
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in abiding by caselaw that allows him to keep the material.14' In 
contrast, an attorney who returns inadvertently sent material that he was 
legally entitled to retain, he may risk a malpractice claim, even though 
he has abided by the professional rules of ethics.14* 
Analyzing the waiver issue by concentrating on the goals sought to 
be obtained by both the attorney-client privilege and the ethical rules of 
conduct will help resolve this dilemma. As this Article discusses, 
enhancing attorney responsibility should be the governing precept in 
deciding waiver since it best serves the underlying goals of promoting 
client confidence in the legal system and the fair administration of 
justice. Viewing the waiver question from the vantage of attorney 
responsibility, the reasonable precautions test is the most appropriate test 
of waiver since it encourages professionalism. This, in turn, protects 
client confidences and allows the attorney to conform his conduct to 
meet ethical obligations. 
111. ANALYSIS OF THE TESTS IN LIGHT OF 
ATTORNEY RESPONSIBILITY 
Using attorney responsibility as a tool in deciding waiver issues is 
in full compliance with both utilitarian and non-utilitarian analyses of 
the attorney-client ~rivi1ege.l~~ The systemic benefits that utilitarians 
weigh include the "observance of law and administration of justice."'44 
Promoting attorney responsibility is particularly important in today's day 
and age where reports of public distrust of attorneys are increasingly 
Attorney responsibility also fosters the non-utilitarian 
considerations behind the attorney-client privilege because it promotes 
the client's desire and ability to rely on attorneys, something that is 
needed to "help[ ] laymen protect their rights and avoid litigation in the 
141. See, e.g., Underwater Storage, 314 F.  Supp. at 549. 
142. See infra note 160 on the feasibility of bringing a malpractice claim in the inadvertent 
disclosure situation. Recently, a California court of appeals ruled that the lower court improperly 
sanctioned a lawyer who was the recipient of inadvertently transmitted privileged documents for 
using the documents. Aerojet-General Corp. v. Transport Indem. Ins., 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 862, 867- 
68 (Ct. App. 1993). In reversing the lower court, the court noted that "[olnce [the recipient] had 
acquired the information in a manner that was not due to his own fault or wrongdoing, he cannot 
purge it from his mind. Indeed, his professional obligation demands that he utilize his knowledge 
about the case on his client's behalf." Id. 
143. For a discussion of the utilitarian and non-utilitarian analyses of the attorney-client 
privilege, see supra notes 116-18 and accompanying text. 
144. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389. 
145. See, e.g., Rorie Sherman, Overhaul of Lawyer Discipline on Docket, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 
21, 1994, at A6; Kay Saillant, A Plea Against Lawyer Jokes Brings Backlash, L.A. TIMES, ept. 
29, 1993, at B3 (quoting the President of the State Bar of California, who noted that "attorneys 
rated 'just above used-car salesmen' " in public confidence polls). 
Heinonline - -  47 Fla. L. Rev. 186 1995 
19951 INADVERTENT DISCLOSURE OF PRIVILEGED MATERIALS 187 
face of complex laws."146 This section analyzes the various waiver 
tests currently used against the backdrop of attorney responsibility. 
A. Attorney Responsibility and the Traditional Test 
Though easy to apply, the simplistic strict liability approach 
embodied by the traditional test does not adequately address the modern 
realities of inadvertent disclosure. The traditional test's first rationale 
that the client's intent to waive is manifested solely by the fact of 
dis~losure '~~ is unrealistic at best and punitive at worst. The tradition- 
alists seek to "punish" the client by placing the onus of maintaining the 
confidentiality of privileged materials on him.148 The rationale flouts 
the stated purpose of the privilege: to promote free flow of information 
between attorneys and clients.I4' Punishing the client hampers the 
desired flow of inf~rmation.'~" 
146. Attorney-Client Privilege, supra note 116, at 1504 n.21 (citing Stephen A. Saltzburg, 
Privileges and Professionals: Lawyers and Psychiatrists, 66 VA. L. REV. 597, 605 (1980)). 
147. See Underwater Storage. 3 14 F. Supp. at 549; supra text accompanying notes 28-3 1. 
148. See, e.g., International Digital Sys. Corp. v. Digital Equip. Corp., 120 F.R.D. 445,450, 
465 (D.D.C. 1988) ("[Mlistake or inadvertence is . . . merely a euphemism for negligence, and, 
certainly . . . one is expected to pay a price for one's negligence.") (quoting In re Standard Fin. 
Management Corp., 77 B.R. 324, 330 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1987) (alteration in original)); 
Underwater Storage, 314 .F. Supp. at 549 (''The Court will not look behind this objective fact 
[of disclosure] to determine whether the plaintiff really intended to have the letter examined. Nor 
will the Court hold that the inadvertence of counsel is not chargeable to his client."). 
The traditional approach's second rationale, that the revelation of confidential communica- 
tions makes the privilege no longer necessary, id., is also problematic. Knowledge of a 
document's contents and ability to use the document in litigation are different things. See 
Manufacturers & Traders Trust Co. v. Servotronics, Inc., 522 N.Y.S.2d 999, 1004 (App. Div. 
1987). As many courts and commentators have noted, a protective order banning the use of the 
revealed confidences will give some protection to the client. See, e.g.. id.; Data Sys., Inc. v. 
Philips Business Sys., Inc., No. 78 Civ. 6015-CSH, at *7-*8 (LEXIS, Genfed Library, DIST 
File) (S.D.N.Y. 1981). See generally Ayres, supra note 8, at 74 (noting there is a trend toward 
maintaining the privilege despite disclosure); Note, supra note 1, at 607-09 (stating that a court 
can prevent the use of a confidential document at trial). Another problem is when an adversary 
knows of the existence of documents containing information damaging to the privilege holder, 
but does not know the actual contents. See supra text accompanying notes 79-81. The facts 
surrounding the disclosure in a particular case may point to a finding of waiver. However, rather 
than imposing a blanket rule which would cover situations where an adversary has not actually 
obtained the "gist" of a document's contents, and situations where the adversary has complete 
knowledge, the reasonable precautions test uses the extent of the disclosure as one of the factors 
used to determine the waiver issue. See Lois Sportswear, 104 F.R.D. at 105; supra text 
accompanying notes 79-81. Presumably the more the adversary knows, the less likely the 
privilege will be upheld. See supra text accompanying note 81. 
149. Fleet Nat'l Bank v. Tonneson & Co., 150 F.R.D. 10, 13 (D. Mass. 1993). 
150. See id. 
Heinonline - -  47 Fla. L. Rev. 187 1995 
From a pragmatic point of view, the traditional view is equally 
detrimental because it is not realistic to expect a client to take precau- 
tions against an attorney's inadvertent disclosure of privileged docu- 
ments. It is one thing if the client has not taken any precautions and has 
allowed documents to be inadvertently d i sc l~sed , '~~  but this is the 
exception in the disclosure cases; the overwhelming majority of cases 
involve inadvertent disclosure by an attorney or agent of the attor- 
ney. lS2 
Notwithstanding the criticism leveled at the traditional test, courts 
continue to use it.lS3 International Digital Systems Corp. v. Digital 
Equipment Corp. exemplifies the traditional test's misplaced retributive 
rationale.'" There, plaintiffs attorney inadvertently disclosed twenty 
151. See e.g., Suburban Sew 'N Sweep, Inc. v. Swiss-Bemina, Inc., 91 F.R.D. 254, 256 
(N.D. Ill. 1981) (holding that documents otherwise within privileged confidential attorney-client . 
communications were no longer privileged when recovered by a third party from the client's 
garbage). 
152. See, e.g., International Digital, 120 F.R.D. at 446-47 (noting that document 
preparation included both attorneys and paralegals); Liggett Group v. Brown & Williamson 
Tobacco Corp., 116 F.R.D. 205, 207 (M.D.N.C. 1986) (inadvertantly disclosed by attorney or 
paralegal); Manufacturers & Traders, 522 N.Y.S.2d at 1002 (noting that the inadvertent 
disclosure was due to a paralegal); 
153. The traditional test is firmly accepted by the United States Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia and its district court. See, e.g., In re Sealed Cases, 877 F.2d 976,980 (D.C. 
Cir. 1989); In re Grand Jury Investigation of Ocean Transp., 604 F.2d 672,675 (D.C. Cir.), cert. 
denied sub nom., Sea-Land Serv., Inc. v. United States, 444 U.S. 915 (1979); Chubb Integrated 
Sys. v. National Bank of Wash., 103 F.R.D. 52,66-67 (D.D.C. 1984). For example, in Wichita 
Land & Cattle Co. v. American Fed. Bank, 148 F.R.D. 456, 457-58 (D.D.C. 1992), the court 
reaffirmed its adherence to the traditional test of waiver, despite its acknowledgement that 
reasonable precautions to avoid the disclosure of privilege documents were taken. The case arose 
out of the FDIC's takeover of two savings and loan associations. Id. at 456-57. Plaintiffs 
counsel inadvertently produced two privileged documents amongst "some forty boxes" of 
documents produced. Id. at 457. When plaintiffs counsel became aware that defendants had seen 
the privileged documents in their initial review of the forty boxes, counsel refused to meet 
defendant's request that the documents be copied and delivered. Id. In granting defendant's 
motion to compel production, the District Court for the District of Columbia, stated: "[Tlhe rule 
in this Circuit is clear. Disclosure of otherwise-privileged materials, even where the disclosure 
was inadvertent, serves as a waiver of the privilege." Id. The court refused to consider the 
precautions taken by plaintiffs counsel to avoid disclosure, or that counsel acted immediately 
upon learning of the error. Id. at 459. Its refusal was based on an adherence to stare decisis and 
on its view that confidentiality, once breached, could not be regained. See id. "What is more 
important than process or intent is that the confidentiality of the disputed documents has been 
irrevocably breached." Id. 
No other circuit court of appeals has specifically stated which waiver test should be used. 
See Harding, supra note 9, at 475. At least one commentator has noted that the district courts 
have not been given any guidance by the higher courts, and that this has led to a variety of rules 
and forum shopping. Id. at 474-79. 
154. See International Digital, 120 F.R.D. at 449-50. 
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privileged documents among some 500,000 produ~ed. '~~ Although the 
court recounted the extensive precautions taken to avoid a disclosure, 
the court ruled that the inadvertent production waived the attorney-client 
privilege as to those documents, and denied plaintiffs motion for a 
protective order.Is6 The court held that the disclosure itself was proof 
that the precautions were inadequate.'" Adopting the reasoning of the 
traditional approach, the court noted that 
[mlistake or inadvertence is . . . merely a euphemism for 
negligence, and, certainly . . . one is expected to pay a 
price for one's negligence[;] 
. . . . a strict rule that "inadvertent" disclosure results in 
a waiver of the privilege would probably do more than 
anything else to instill in attorneys the need for effective 
precautions against such disclosure.'" 
The flaw in such reasoning is apparent: although the negligence is the 
attorney's, the penalty hams the client, whose confidential materials 
were exposed and used against him.''' The client pays the price for his 
attorney's negligence.I6' 
155. Id. at 446. The number of inadvertent disclosures compared to the extent of disclosure, 
a factor courts using the reasonable precautions test consider, certainly would be deemed 
reasonable. See supra note 76 for a list of cases which have analyzed this factor. 
156. International Digital, 120 F.R.D. at 447-50. However, the International Digital court 
refused to find a complete subject matter waiver, limiting the waiver to the documents disclosed. 
Id. at 446 n.1. 
157. Id. at 449-50. 
158. Id. at 450 (second omission in original) (citation omitted) (quoting In re Standard Fin. 
Management Corp., 77 B.R. at 330 (emphasis added). 
159. See Harding, supra note 9, at 497 & 497 n.159. 
160. See id. at 497. At least one court using the traditional test suggested that the client had 
recourse against his attorney through a malpractice suit See Mendenhall, 531 F. Supp. at 955 
("Mendenhall's lawyer . . . might well have been negligent. . . ."); see also Davidson & Voth, 
supra note 8, at 646; Note, supra note 1, at 604 n.27. However, the feasibility of a successful 
lawsuit based on an inadvertent disclosure of privileged documents is questionable. See Harding 
supra note 9, at 497 n.159; Note, supra note 1, at 604 n.27. The elements of a tort action for 
malpractice include (i) the duty to use such skill, prudence, and diligence as would the 
reasonable attorney, (ii) breach of duty of care, (iii) proximate cause between the negligent act 
or omission and harm to the plaintiff, and (iv) actual loss or harm to the plaintiff. See generally 
DAVID J .  MEISELMAN, A ~ R N E Y  MALPRA~CE:  ~ i w  AND PROCEDURE 14, 39-40 (1980) 
(discussing legal malpractice). The plaintiff bears the burden of proving these elements. Id. at 
39. The client may have difficulty in establishing that the attorney breached his duty to use 
reasonable care. Harding, supra note 9, at 497 n.159. The duty of reasonable care requires only 
that the attorney "render fair and reasonable professional services on a par with other attorneys 
acting under similar circumstances." MEISELMAN, supra, at 14. As noted by Harding, if the 
attorney shows that he took reasonable precautions to avoid inadvertent disclosure, "a jury would 
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While on its face it appears that the traditional test is the most 
effective means of promoting attorney responsibility, in fact, the 
opposite may be true.I6' The result of an inadvertent disclosure is an 
automatic waiver;'62 however, unprofessional or sloppy conduct may 
not have been the cause of the discl~sure. '~~ A blanket rule does not 
discriminate between different degrees of care an attorney might take to 
avoid disclosure and therefore does not reward professional excel- 
1 e n ~ e . I ~ ~  The traditional test may also result in the decreased flow of 
information between attorney and client, in direct contradiction to the 
purposes of the privilege.16' 
B. Attorney Responsibility and the Subjective Intent Test 
The subjective intent test demands that a client actually intend to 
waive his privilege; therefore, the test eliminates waiver as a result of 
probably find that reasonable care had been used." Harding, supra note 9, at 498 n.159. 
Reasonable care may exist even if the attorney has violated his ethical responsibilities. See id. 
Most cases hold that such a violation does not constiute malpractice. E.g., Palmer v. Westmeyer, 
549 N.E.2d 1202, 1205 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988); Weiszmann v. Kirkland & Ellis, 732 F. Supp. 
1540, 1544 (D. Colo. 1990); Peck v. Meda-Care Ambulance Corp., 457 N.W.2d 538, 541-43 
(Wis. Ct. App. 1990). 
Thus, even in a case using the traditional test of waiver, when the attorney's duty of care 
is questioned, the issue, for malpractice purposes, ultimately comes down to whether the attorney 
took reasonable precautions. See Harding, supra note 9, at 497 n.159. However, in using the 
traditional test, something akin to a shifting of the burden of proof occurs. See MEISELMAN, 
supra, at 39-40; Harding, supra note 9, at 497 n.159. As noted above, in the malpractice suit 
that results from application of the traditional test's harsh waiver rule, the plaintiff will have to 
establish that the attorney did not follow a reasonable standard of care. MEISELMAN, supra, at 
39-40; Harding, supra note 9, at 497 n.159. In contrast, under the reasonable precautions test, 
the party seeking a protective order bamng the use of inadvertently produced documents bears 
the burden of proving that reasonable care was taken to avoid disclosure. See Golden Valley 
Microwave Foods, Inc. v. Weaver Popcorn Co., 132 F.R.D. 204,207 (N.D. Ind. 1990). 
The client in a traditional test case also will likely have difficulty in establishing the 
elements of actual harm and proximate cause. Harding, supra note 9, at 497 n.159. For a 
thorough analysis of the feasibility of a malpractice suit based on an inadvertent disclosure, see 
id. at 497 n. 159. 
161. See Harding, supra note 9, at 497 n.159 (noting that with the difficulty faced by the 
client in holding an attorney responsible for a disclosure, there is little pressure on the attorney 
to be more careful). 
162. Meese, supra note 9, at 536-37; Note, supra note 1, at 598. 
163. See Wichita Land, 148 F.R.D. at 457-58 (holding that privilege waived despite 
reasonable precautions to avoid disclosure taken by the attorney); Harding, supra note 9, at 497 
n. 159. 
164. See Harding, supra note 9, at 497 n.159. 
165. See Meese, supra note 9, at 536-38. The goal of the privilege is to encourage frank 
communication between client and attorney. See supra note 121 and accompanying text. 
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an inadvertent discl~sure.'~ Neither courts that reject the subjective 
intent test nor commentators who espouse it have concentrated on the 
broader question of attorney responsibility and the concomitant ethical 
considerations of ~0nfidentiality.l~~ The subjective intent test is 
completely ineffective in fostering attorney respon~ibility'~~ even 
though it is undoubtedly the most effective means of upholding the 
attorney-client privilege since waiver never occurs.169 Its effectiveness 
in upholding the privilege is the very reason that the subjective intent 
test does nothing to increase attorney re~ponsibi1ity.l~~ An attorney 
need not take any care in protecting against waiver if he knows no 
sanctions will be visited upon hirn.17' From a cost-benefit analysis, he 
would be foolish to spend time taking care to protect against inadvertent 
disclosure because no harm, in terms of waiver, will occur if he is 
careless.'" Instead, the subjective intent test improperly places the 
burden of attorney responsibility on the recipient of the privileged 
 material^.'^^ The recipient, who already is at a disadvantage in that he 
is not going to receive all relevant information because of the truth- 
suppressing function of the attorney-client privilege,'74 should not bear 
this responsibility. Moreover, the attorney for the recipient should not 
bear the burden of maintaining his opposing counsel's ethical responsi- 
bility to keep his client's  confidence^.'^^ 
166. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text. 
167. See, e.g., Hartman v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 763 P.2d 1144, 1152 (N.M. 1988) 
(failing to address attorney responsibility and ethics while explicitly rejecting the subjective 
intent test); Ayres, supra note 8, at 61 (focusing on the narrow question of what should 
constitute waiver in the context of inadvertent disclosure rather than considering the broader 
policy issue of attorney responsibility). 
168. An argument could be made that recklessness or gross negligence on the attorney's 
part would amount to a .waiver since the cases only speak in terms of mere negligence. 
Mendenhall, 531 F. Supp. at 955. 
169. See, e.g.. id. Rarely would a client admit an intent to disclose privileged materials. 
WIGMORE, supra note 3, 5 2327, at 636. 
170. See Mendenhall, 531 F. Supp. at 955. The Mendenhall court held that without the 
subjective intent to waive on the part of the client, a lawyer's negligent disclosure of privileged 
information is not sufficient to waive the attorney-client privilege. See id. In effect, the 
subjective intent test takes away the incentive for the attorney to protect a client's privileged 
information because the privilege will not be waived by attorney negligence. See id. 
171. See supra note 170 and accompanying text. 
172. See Mendenhall, 531 F. Supp. at 955. 
173. See supra text accompanying notes 109-10 (stating that the receiving attorney is 
responsible for screening the information believed to be privileged under the subjective intent 
test). 
174. WIGMORE, supra note 3, 5 2291, at 554. 
175. See Aerojet-General Corp. v. Transport Indem. Ins., 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 862, 867 (Ct. 
App. 1993) (noting that the recipient of inadvertently disclosed material did not act in violation 
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Commentators who support the subjective intent test suggest that 
without an absolute rule against waiver, privilege will be secondary to 
the search for information in a particular case.'" This fear is rnis- 
placed. The broad policy underpinnings for the attorney-client privilege 
may or may not justify applying it in a case where the adversary knows 
specific damaging information. Certainly circumstances exist where the 
privilege may be upheld even though an adversary has seen specific 
information. For example, courts do not allow a party or its agent to use 
privileged materials that have been st01en.I~~ However, situations also 
of any rule in keeping the material and that any duty the attorney owed was to protect the 
interest of his own clients). 
176. See, e.g., Meese, supra note 9, at 535-36. This fear was specifically rejected by the 
court in Lien v. Wilson & McIlvaine, No. 87 C 6397, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5129, at *6 (N.D. 
111. June 2, 1988), which, in denying a motion to compel production of an inadvertently 
disclosed document, noted: 
It is now necessary to comment upon defendant's claim that the relevance of the 
document overcomes the privilege. It is a rare case, undoubtedly, in which access 
to attorney-client material would not aid the search for truth. It is axiomatic that 
the privilege may act in derogation of the truth. Nevertheless, it is believed that 
overall the search for truth is enhanced by a client's full and complete disclosure 
to one's attorney. Defendant has cited no authority for its proposition that the 
probative quality of the evidence should determine whether the veil of privilege 
should be lifted, and the court believes there is none. 
Id. at *6. 
177. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings Involving Berkley & Co., 466 F. Supp. 863, 869 
(D. Minn. 1979), affd as modified, 629 F.2d 548 (8th Cir. 1980); State v. Sugar, 417 A.2d 474, 
480 (N.J. 1980). See generally Kanellis, supra note 1 (discussing applicability of attorney-client 
privilege to stolen information). In the past, courts did not follow the rule that stolen material 
retained their privileged status. Id. at 269. The traditional view on involuntary disclosure, akin 
to the traditional test on inadvertent disclosure, was that any disclosure waived the privilege. See 
WIGMORE, supra note 3, 5 2326, at 633. At least two proposed Federal Rules of Evidence dealt 
specifically with involuntarily disclosed material. Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 503(a)(4) 
stated: " 'A communication is "confidential" if not intended to be disclosed to third persons 
other than those to whom disclosure is in furtherance of the rendition of professional legal 
services to the client or those reasonably necessary for the transmission of the communication."' 
Mendenhall, 531 F. Supp. at 955 n.8 (quoting proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 503(a)(4)). 
Proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 51 1 stated: 
A person upon whom these rules confer a privilege against disclosure of the 
confidential matter or communication waives the privilege if he or his predecessor 
while holder of the privilege voluntarily discloses or consents to disclosure of any 
significant part of the matter or communication. This rule does not apply if the 
disclosure is itself a privileged communication. 
FED. R. EVID. 51 1 (Proposed 1973). reprinted in Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and 
Magistrates, 56 F.R.D. 183, 258 (1973). 
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exist where waiver would be appropriate. For example, where an 
adversary has seen and relied on information he inadvertently obtained, 
the court may find the privilege waived.'78 Any absolute rule that does 
not take into account the particulars of an inadvertent disclosure is 
undesirable. 
The subjective intent test's failure to encourage attorney responsibili- 
ty may also compromise an attorney's vigilance in keeping his ethical 
duty to maintain client confidences. Even though the attorney may be 
subject to disciplinary proceedings for violating the professional rules 
of conduct, an inadvertent waiver will not result in any legal repercus- 
sions to the case.I7' The client retains an evidentiary privilege against 
use of the disclosed information, but is left with the knowledge that his 
confidences were revealed and his privacy breached, possibly subjecting 
him to embarrassment or other criticism.180 
In sum, the subjective intent test, on its face the most protective of 
the attorney-client privilege, in fact gives attorneys no incentive to avoid 
inadvertent disclosure and therefore may ironically diminish both the 
likelihood that client confidences remain undisclosed and client trust in 
attorneys. As one court noted, the subjective intent test "poses the risk 
of undermining the obligation of counsel to exercise due diligence and 
to employ reasonable and effective screening procedures . . . ."18' 
Congress did not enact these sections, passing instead the more general Federal Rule of 
Evidence 501, which states: "the privilege of a . . . person . . . shall be governed by the 
principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in 
light of reason and experience." See FED. R. EVID. 501. However, courts and commentators 
consider the proposed rules as a .  guide to the existing Federal Rules of Evidence. See 
Mendenhall, 531 F. Supp. at 955 n.8; Transamerica Computer Co. v. International Business 
Mach. Corp., 573 F.2d 646, 651 (9th Cir. 1978); Kanellis, supra note 1, at 269. 
178. See In re Grand Jury Investigation of Ocean Tramp., 604 F.2d at 674 (finding waiver 
where adversary based deposition on information contained in privileged documents and 
privilege holder waited 15 months before claiming that the documents were privileged). 
179. See R u m  REGULATING THE FLORIDA BAR Rule 41.6 (1994). Each state has 
procedures for filing complaints of breaches of ethical duties against attorneys. See, e.g., RULES 
REGULATING THE FLORIDA BAR Rule 3-7.3 (1995). Typically, a grievance committee is 
established to receive, investigate, and impose sanctions. See, e.g., id. Available sanctions 
include censureship, suspension, and disbarment. See, e.g.. State ex rel. Florida Bar v. Munell, 
74 So. 2d 221, 223 (Fla. 1954). However the extremely small amount of cases in which 
attorneys' have been disciplined has eroded confidence in the self-governence of lawyers and 
in the legal profession in general. See Edward D. Re, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with 
the Legal Profession, 68 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 85, 89 (1994). 
180. See generally Davidson & Voth, supra note 8, at 641 (calling the privilege a 
protection of privacy and stating that the client may not feel comfortable revealing confidences 
if he knows others may have access to them). 
181. Bras v. Atlas Constr. Corp., 545 N.Y.S.2d 723,725 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989); see also 
Marcus, supra note 1, at 1636. 
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C .  Attorney Responsibility and the Reasonable 
Precautions Test 
Although courts and commentators never make specific reference to 
it, attorney responsibility is seemingly the unspoken premise of most of 
the factors considered in determining whether reasonable precautions 
have been taken. For example, the first factor, reasonableness of 
precautions taken,18' considers the mechanics of the overall document 
production and how the accidental disclosure occurred.'83 This analysis 
focuses almost solely on what the attorney has done to cull privileged 
documents.184 Thus, where a client responded to a subpoena duces 
tecum requesting all non-privileged documents by shipping the entire 
non-segregated file to his attorneys, and the attorneys then failed to 
remove all of the privileged materials, the court asked why the attorney 
took no other  precaution^.'^' The court was concerned with the level 
of legal expertise of the screener and why a second screening was not 
01dered.I~~ 
It is the attorney who must decide the appropriate screening structure 
for the type of document production sought. For example, with a 
voluminous production, an elaborate procedure with multiple layers of 
review may be warranted. The more elaborate the screening procedure 
devised by the attorney, the more likely it is that a finding of reason- 
ableness will be made if an inadvertent disclosure occurs.187 Of course, 
a well-structured screening procedure should have the benefit of 
reducing the number of inadvertent disclosures.188 
On the other hand, procedures in place to avoid a clerical mistake 
such as a missent fax may be nothing more than having adequate 
clerical training. The courts have answered the question of whether a 
single clerical error will waive the attorney-client p r i~ i lege , '~~  an issue 
182. Lois Sportswear, 104 F.R.D. at 105. 
183. See Kanter v. Superior Court, 253 Cal. Rptr. 810, 819 (Ct. App. 1988); supra notes 
70-73 and accompanying text. 
184. See Kanter, 253 Cal. Rptr. at 819. 
185. See id. 
186. Id. 
187. See supra note 72 and accompanying text. 
188. See id. The procedure need not be so elaborate as to guarantee non-disclosure, but 
only a reasonable procedure. See Lois Sportswear, 104 F.R.D. at 105. The level of precautions 
needed has evolved, and will continue to evolve, as the courts rule on the cases before them, 
thereby setting the standard of reasonableness as they do in other contexts where reasonableness 
is the criteria. 
189. See, e.g., Berg Elecs., Inc. v. Molex, Inc., 875 F. Supp. 261, 263 (D. Del. 1995) 
(holding no waiver of privilege where law firm staff incorrectly photocopied documents that they 
were instructed not to photocopy). 
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the ABA addressed in its first opinion on inadvertent disclosure.1g0 In 
all such situations, the courts employing a reasonable precautions test, 
or a variation of the reasonable precautions test, have refused to find a 
waiver of the attorney-client pri~ilege.'~' In so doing, the courts have 
implicitly established a standard of reasonableness that recognizes that 
isolated clerical mistakes do happen.lg2 Therefore, to the extent the 
ABA appears to have adopted a subjective intent test to avoid the 
finding of waiver for the errant release of privileged materials,Ig3 
adoption of a reasonable precautions test will create the same result, 
without the costs the subjective intent test entails.lg4 
Attorney responsibility also governs the second factor used in the 
reasonable precautions test-the number of documents disclosed.195 
The courts consider the total number of documents produced compared 
to the number of privileged matters released and the production's time 
frame.Ig6 One commentator has noted that considering a ratio of 
privileged to non-privileged documents produced will encourage 
attorneys to produce an excessive amount of documents that may add 
additional time and expense to already protracted litigation.lg7 Thus, 
even criticism of the test centers on what an attorney might do. In fact, 
the commentator's fears are misplaced because the courts are aware of 
this litigation strategy and any attempt to "dump" documents on an 
adversary would be evaluated as part of the "overall fairness" f a ~ t 0 r . l ~ ~  
In any event, over-production of documents as a litigation strategy is a 
double-edged sword since there is greater likelihood that privileged 
190. See ABA, supra note 15, at 1001:158; supra text accompanying notes 97-98. 
191. See, e.g., United States v. Zolin, 809 F.2d 1411, 1417 (9th Cir. 1987), a f d  in part 
and vacated in part, 491 U.S. 554 (1989) (vacating holdings regarding when an in camera 
review is appropriate); Robertson v. Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A., 143 F.R.D. 194, 198 (S.D. 
111. 1992). 
192. One would expect that the courts would not find that repeated clerical errors were 
reasonable. 
193. See ABA, supra note 15, at 1001:158; supra text accompanying notes 103-05. 
194. See supra notes 54-58 and accompanying text. 
195. Lois Sportswear, 104 F.R.D. at 105. 
196. See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text for citations to cases which compare 
the number of documents to the number of disclosures. 
197. Meese, supra note 9, at 542. 
198. See Parkway Gallery Furniture, Inc. v. KittingerIPennsylvania House Group, Inc., 116 
F.R.D. 46.51 (M.D.N.C. 1987) (considering charge of "document dumping*' in its five factor 
review); Granada Corp. v. Honorable First Court of Appeals, 844 S.W.2d 223, 227 (Tex. 1992) 
(reasoning that looking only to proportion of inadvertent disclosure to total disclosure may 
encourage a flooding of discovery documents); Advance Medical, Inc. v. Arden Medical Sys., 
Inc., No. 87-3059, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7297, at 7-8 (E.D. Pa. July 18, 1988). 
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matters will be d i sc l~sed . '~~  Attorneys should thus be discouraged from 
document dumping. 
The fourth and fifth factors the courts examine, promptness of 
response to disclosure and overall fairness:00 also emphasize attomey 
action. Typically, it is the attorney who moves to rectify the problem. 
The attorney's failure to act promptly may cause the court to rule that 
intent to waive existed, whereas an attorney's prompt action to retrieve 
the material will inure to his benefit."' 
The reasonable precautions test, which calls for an individual 
examination of the details of the inadvertent disclosure:02 best pro- 
motes societal goals of encouraging attorney-client communications and 
individual faith in the system. Additionally, it encourages and rewards 
attorneys who take care to avoid inadvertent disclos~re?~ while 
protecting clients from bearing the heaviest burden of their attorneys' 
lack of due care.204 Blanket rules on waiver may be easy to apply, but 
they are too broad to ensure the fair administration of each case or to 
promote systemic benefits to society.205 Thus the traditional test's 
rigidity has led one court to criticize it as "atavistic, generating harsh 
results out of all proportion to the mistake of inadvertent disclo- 
sure.'7206 At the other extreme, never finding waiver as espoused by the 
199. See Advance Medical, 1988 U.S.  Dist. LEXIS 7297, at *6. An additional risk of 
document dumping that should discourage its use is that if there is an inadvertent disclosure the 
courts may find a subject matter waiver and order the production of all other privileged 
documents relating to the same subject. See, e.g., Hartman v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 763 P.2d 
1 144, 11 52-53 (N.M. 1988). 
200. Lois Sportswear, 104 F.R.D. at 105. See supra text accompanying notes 82-92 for a 
description of the fourth and fifth factors. 
201. See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text. 
202. See Lois Sportswear, 104 F.R.D. at 105. See supra text accompanying notes 64-96 for 
a description of the reasonable precautions test. 
203. See In re Grand Jury Investigation, 142 F.R.D. 276,279-80 (M.D.N.C. 1992). 
204. See supra notes 148, 159-60 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 160 and 
accompanying text for a discussion of the malpractice aspects of an inadvertent disclosure. Since 
reasonable precautions, or the lack thereof, would be the basis of the client's suit against his 
attomey, see supra note 160 and accompanying text, the reasonable precautions test best protects 
the client. 
205. Other situations exist where rules are moving from specific to more generalized 
standards. For example, in the criminal law area, the legislatures have been moving from strict 
tests of what constitutes provocation sufficient to reduce murder to manslaughter to more 
flexible standards of measuring extreme emotional disturbance. Compare People v. Casassa, 404 
N.E.2d 1310, 1316 (N.Y. 1980) (concluding that extreme emotional disturbance is measured 
from the subjective viewpoint of the defendant, and then objectively assessed to determine 
whether the disturbance was reasonable) with Commonwealth v. Bermudez, 348 N.E.2d 802,803 
(Mass. 1976) (stating the Massachusetts rule that "[i]nsults or quarreling alone cannot provide 
a reasonable provocation"). 
206. Mendenhall, 531 F. Supp. at 955 n.8. 
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subjective intent test, may also generate unfair  result^?^ Instead, the 
appropriate waiver test should focus on the attorney's actions. The 
reasonable precautions test allows for an examination of the totality of 
the circumstances in detedning whether there has been a waiver 
through inadvertent disclosure of the attorney-client privilege?08 This 
test most fairly addresses the needs generated by large scale document 
productions while placing the emphasis on the entity most responsible 
for controlling the problem: the attorney. In doing so, the reasonable 
precautions test best comports with the reasoning behind the attorney: 
client privilege and with the ethical and legal obligations attorneys have 
toward their clients. 
D. The ABA Test and Attorney Responsibility 
The ABA's approach to inadvertently transmitted documents appears 
to state a blanket rule that a receiving attorney should return an 
inadvertently disclosed document that on its face appears to be 
confidential, because the receiving attorney will know that the document 
is privileged and know that the sending attorney does not want him to 
use it?"' In placing the confidentiality of the document above all other 
 concern^^^^ the ABA approach is similar to the subjective intent test 
of waiver?" The blanket rule of "return and ignore" not only limits 
the receiving attorney's ability to use inadvertently sent materials, it 
places a burden on the recipient to rectify the situation by notifying the 
sender and returning the document?'* In so doing, the ABA has 
ignored the sending attorney's responsibility to take care to avoid 
inadvertent disclosure and to bear responsibility when the disclosure 
occurs. 
To the extent that the ABA test is seen as adopting a subjective 
intent test?l3 it fails to encourage attorney responsibility for the same 
reasons that apply to the subjective intent test?14 The ABA test not 
only does nothing to encourage attorney care, its reasoning is flawed 
once it is extended beyond its factual setting, an isolated occurrence of 
207. Harding. supra note 9. at 484; see supra text accompanying notes 54-58.. 
208. Harding, supra note 9, at 478. 
209. See ABA, supra note 15. at 1001:155. 
210. Id. at 1001:155-56. 
21 1. See Mendenhall, 531 F. Supp. at 955; see supra text accompanying notes 43-53 for 
a description of the subjective intent test. 
212. See ABA, supra note 15, at 1001:155. 
213. See supra text accompanying notes 103-04. 
214. See discussion supra Part IILB. Whether the ABA has, in fact, adopted the subjective 
intent test is not clear. See supra text accompanying notes 103-05. 
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an errant transmittal of a single document.215 In that instance it is fair 
to say that when an attorney receives a document addressed to someone 
else but mistakenly faxed to him, he should know that the disclosure 
was accidental. Return of the document seems the fair and just response. 
The recipient cannot claim reliance since the error is immediately 
apparent. However, the ABA test falters when one analyzes it against 
the backdrop of a large document production. It may not be apparent to 
the recipient that he is viewing privileged documents, and the burden 
should not be placed on him to rectify the situation?I6 Because the 
attorney had no part in the mistaken transmittal and may have already 
relied upon the information contained in the document, the rule of 
"return and ignore" is unrealistic and unfair. 
As noted above, to the extent one views the ABA approach as 
adopting the subjective intent test;l7 it does nothing to encourage 
professional excellence?18 However, the ABA opinion does contain 
language suggesting ABA endorsement of the reasonable precautions 
test.219 Reconciling the ABA opinion with the reasonable precautions 
test is desirable for two reasons. First, doing so reduces the conflict 
between the two sets of rules that protect client confidences, the attorney 
client privilege and the ethical rules of professional resp~nsibility?'~ 
Second, since the reasonable precautions test best promotes attorney 
215. The ABA's analogy to bailment law, ABA, supra note 15, at 1001:159-60, appears 
to be most applicable in the context of the single errant document. In that situation, it would be 
obvious to a reasonable person that the transmittal was not meant for the recipient. But in the 
more common situation, not specifically addressed by the ABA opinion, a number of privileged 
documents are released as part of a large-scale document production. See, e.g., Transamerica 
Computer Co. v. International Business Mach. Corp., 573 F.2d 646,650 (9th Cir. 1978). It may 
not be clear to the recipient that the sender did not intend him to use the materials. In such a 
situation the recipient may not be the document's baiiee since as a general rule, a bailment does 
not arise when possession of property passes to another by mistake. 8 AM. JUR. 2D Bailments 
8 63 (1980). 
216. See, e.g., Aerojet-General Corp. v. Transport Indem. Ins., 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 862, 865 
(Ct. App. 1993) (reversing a sanction imposed on a recipient of inadvertently disclosed 
information for not notifying the sender of the error and noting that the attorney had no legal 
or ethical duty to the sender). The ABA opinion is specific to "materials that on their face 
appear to be subject to the attorney-client privilege or otherwise confidential, under circumstanc- 
es where it is clear they were not intended for the receiving lawyer." ABA, supra note 15, at 
1001:155. 
While the ABA opinion concerns a situation that arose out of a complex asbestos litigation, 
the disclosure itself was not part of a massive document production, but was the result of an 
isolated clerical error. See supra note 97 and accompanying text. 
217. See supra text accompanying notes 103-04. 
218. See discussion supra Part IILB. (discussing the failures of the subjective intent test). 
219. See ABA, supra note 15, at 1001:158-59; supra text accompanying notes 104-07. 
220. See discussion supra Part 11. 
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responsibility, which, in turn, provides systemic benefits to so~ie ty ,~ '  
an interpretation of the ABA opinion that endorses the reasonable 
precautions approach would also be most effective in promoting attorney 
responsibility. 
The ABA's endorsement of the reasonable precautions test is 
apparent in a number of ways. First, the ABA's reliance on property 
lends support to a reasonable precautions test as determinative 
of when a recipient may make use of missent documents. More 
specifically, when one speaks of the recipient "using" a privileged 
document, one means that the recipient will be using the information 
contained in the document. Assuming that the ideas contained in a 
privileged document are themselves the sender's property:" one may 
221. See discussion supra Part II1.C. 
222. See ABA, supra note 15, at 1001: 159-60; supra notes 108-15 and accompanying text. 
223. An in-depth analysis of whether raw information or ideas may qualify as property is 
beyond the scope of this Article. However, when the raw information is contained in a document 
covered by the attorney-client privilege, it becomes the creator's property because it has the 
critical features of property. See Pamela Samuelson, Infonnation as Property: Do Ruckelshaus 
and Carpenter Signal a Changing Direction in Intellectual Property Law?, 38 CATH. U. L. REV. 
365, 370 (1989). The term "property" is defined in terms of the property holder's rights. See 
BLACK'S LAW D I ~ O N A R Y  1217-18 (6th ed. 1990). Typically, the rights include: (1) the right 
to use, possess, and enjoy; (2) the right to transfer;' and (3) the right to exclude others. United 
States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945). These are commonly referred to as 
a "bundle of rights." See, e,g., Kaiser Aetna v. United States 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979). 
The definition works easily with tangible items or "things." See Samuelson, supra, at 370. , 
An individual's house, car, or merchandise belongs to that person and can be physically 
possessed. Employing the "bundle of rights" test, the courts have also deemed certain intangible 
items as one's property. See, e.g., Andrew Beckerman-Rodau, Are Ideas Within the Traditional 
Defmition of Property?: A Jurisprudential Analysis, 47 ARK. L. REV. 603, 605 n.5 (1994) 
(noting that courts have considered pension rights, trade secrets, valid contracts, and real estate 
liens as property). 
Moving down the spectrum of tangibility, the law traditionally has been reluctant to classify 
information or ideas as property. Sarnuelson, supra, at 365. One commentator has suggested that 
the reluctance stems from the Age of Enlightenment principle that information should be shared 
to stimulate innovation and to increase wealth. Id. at 367. Moreover, the difficulty in defining 
what is meant by the term "information," and the fact that information is virtually incapable of 
confinement, contribute to the difficulty in recognizing it as "property." Id. at 368. Therefore, 
the law typically has not protected information, but rather, the form it takes. For example, 
copyright and patent laws deem that a property interest arises, not in the ideas or information 
that form the basis of one's work or invention, but the unique presentation of the information 
or in the manner in which it may be used. Id. at 372-73 (discussing that what copyright laws 
protect is the writer's "expression," or the form the information takes); see aka 35 U.S.C. 8 154 
(1994) (stating that patent holders have the exclusive right to make, use, or sell their inventions 
for 17 years). 
The law of trade secret comes closest to holding that information is property. Samuelson, 
supra, at 374. For a further discussion of trade secrets, see infra notes 224-56 and accompanying 
text. 
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make an analogy to the protection the law gives to other types of 
confidential property. 
For example, in the area of trade  secret^:^ such as formulas or 
customer lists, the law imposes not a strict. responsibility test, as 
embodied by the traditional test of waiver:25 but a reasonable precau- 
tions testzz6 to determine whether the confidentiality of such materials 
should be enf~rced.'~' The reasoning employed by courts considering 
trade secret questions is instructive on how the courts should view the 
inadvertent disclosure of privileged communications. As with the 
attorney-client privilege, the purpose of affording trade secret status to 
certain types of information, and to protect them from disclosure or use 
by one other than its holder, is to maintain the confidentiality of the 
materials.228 Thus, secrecy is the most important factor in trade secret 
The Supreme Court has given some indication that it will consider some types of raw 
information as one's property. See International News Sew. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 
236 (1918) (finding a quasi-property interest in the results of one newspaper's news gathering 
efforts); Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1003-04 (1984) (holding that property 
interest in environmental data is cognizable as a trade secret). For an in-depth analysis of the 
implications of these Supreme Court cases, see Samuelson, supra. 
224. The Restatement of Torts defines a trade secret as one which 
may consist of any formula, pattern, device or compilation of information which 
is used in one's business, and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an 
advantage over competitors who do not know or use it. It may be a formula for a 
chemical compound, a process of manufacturing, treating or preserving materials, 
a pattern for a machine or other device, or a list of customers. 
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS 8 757 cmt. b (1939); see also UNIF. TRADE SECRETS A m  5 1, 14 
U.L.A. 433, 438 (1985) (defining trade secret as "information, including a formula, pattern, 
compilation, program, device, method, technique, or process, that . . . (ii) is the subject of 
efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy"). 
225. See supra text accompanying notes 28-3 1. 
226. See supra notes 66-92 and accompanying text. 
227. See, e.g., Defiance Button Mach. Co. v. C & C Metal Prods. Corp., 759 F.2d 1053, 
1063 (2d Cir.) (stating that inadvertent disclosure of trade secrets is not waiver of protection if . 
reasonable precautions are taken to protect secrecy), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 844 (1985). 
228. See Beckerman-Rodau, supra note 223, at 627-29. Professor Beckerman-Rodau takes 
the position that, under certain circumstances, ideas may be deemed property. Id. at 649. 
According to him, trade secrets law has developed to provide control over the access to such 
ideas. Id. at 627-28. Unless confidentiality exists, the ideas will no longer be protected. Id. at 
627. He notes, 
Property rights in something normally do not depend on maintaining secrecy; 
however, the definition of property requires that the owner has the right of 
dominion and control over the thing and thereby the right to exclude others from 
using it. If the trade secret owner fails to maintain secrecy, the trade secret will 
become public information, and it will be impossible for the owner to exert any 
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protection.229 Without secrecy, the need for trade secret protection no 
longer e~ists.2~' Thus if the material for which trade secret protection 
is sought is "readily a~certainable,'.'~' in other words, not secret, the 
protection is Yet even with the strict secrecy requirements 
of trade secret law, the law of misappropriation of trade secrets uses a 
reasonable precautions test to determine whether information is a trade 
secret.u3 In other words, the law of trade secrets has not found that 
disclosure per se is the decisive factor in denying trade secret protec- 
tion; the issue is whether the holder of the trade secret took reasonable 
precautions to protect it.234 The courts will refuse trade secret protec- 
tion, even where improper means were employed to obtain the materials, 
if the holder did not take reasonable precautions against discl~sure?~~ 
The trade secret reasonable precautions standard directly parallels the 
reasonable precautions test used to decide whether an inadvertently 
disclosed document is still protected by the attorney-client privilege. The 
following example demonstrates the extent of the similarities in concept 
and treatment between the preservation of trade secret protection and of 
privileged documents. Frank W. Winne & Son, Inc. v. Palmer,u6 
involved a manufacturer whose trash was routinely taken by a rival 
rnanufa~turer.~~ In the trash, the rival found customer invoices, 
customer lists, purchase orders and other documents relating to the 
manufacturer's pricing and territory.238 The plaintiff claimed that the 
materials found in the trash were trade secrets and sued its rival for 
interference with its trade se~rets?~' The rival argued that information 
dominion and control over it. 
Id. 
229. Id. 
230. Id. 
231. See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS Am 3 1; supra note 227, at 438. 
232. See, e.g., Defiance, 759 F.2d at 1063-64. 
233. See supra text accompanying note 227. 
234. The courts, in considering whether an item of information is entitled to trade secret 
protection are asked to look to a number of factors including "the extent of measures taken . . . 
to guard the secrecy of the information." Defiance, 759 F.2d at 1063. 
235. See, e.g., id. at 1064, Julie Research Lab., Inc. v. Select Photographic Eng'g, Inc., 810 
F. Supp. 513,520 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), a f d  in part, vacated in part, 998 F.2d 65 (2d Cir. 1993); 
Greenblatt v. Prescription Plan Servs. Cop., 783 F. Supp. 814, 826 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). 
236. No. 91-2239, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11 183 .(ED. Pa. Aug. 7, 1991). 
237. Id. at *l. 
238. Id. 
239. Id. 
. 
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in the trash was not a protected trade secret because the plaintiff had not 
taken adequate precautions to avoid disclosure.'* 
The court agreed with the defendant and stated that the information 
in the trash had probably lost its trade secret pr~tection.'~' As a 
starting point, the court noted that, even though secrecy is the most 
important factor in the law of trade secrecy:42 the standard by which 
to judge whether a trade secret has been established is the degree of 
reasonable precautions taken to ensure secrecy.243 Thus, the issue 
became whether the plaintiff, in putting its office documents in the 
garbage and out for collection, took reasonable precautions to ensure the 
secrecy of its materials. The Winne court relied on Fourth Amendment 
cases that have held that "there is no reasonable expectation of privacy 
in trash which is placed out for c~llection,"'~ to find that plaintiff 
failed to take reasonable precautions to protect its trade secret since it 
could not, as a matter of law, have a reasonable expectation of privacy 
in the tra~h.2~' 
Almost identical facts faced the United States District Court for the 
Northern District of Illinois in Suburban Sew 'N Sweep, Inc. v. Swiss- 
Bemina, I ~ c . ' ~ ~  There, instead of containing trade secrets, the trash left 
out for collection consisted of drafts of confidential letters sent by a 
client to his attorney, matters plainly protected by the attorney client 
pri~ilege.2~~ As in Winne, the parties were business corn petit or^.^^' 
240. Id. at *2. 
241. Id. at *4. The court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss stating that the record 
lacked the details necessary to grant the motion. Id. at *19. However, the court did state that. 
"it is rather difficult to find that one has taken reasonable precautions to safeguard a trade secret 
when one leaves it in a place where, as a matter of law, he has no reasonable expectation of 
privacy from prying eyes." Id. at *11. 
242. Id. at "3. 
243. Id. at *7. The court also stated that " '[tlhe secrecy in which a purported trade secret 
is shrouded need not be absolute but reasonable precautions under the circumstances must be 
taken to prevent disclosure to unauthorized parties.' " Id. (quoting Anaconda Co. v. Metric Tool 
& Die Co., 485 F. Supp. 410, 422 (E.D. Pa. 1980)). 
244. Winne, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11 183, at 810. See generally California v. Greenwood, 
486 U.S. 35,40-41 (1988) (concluding that respondents lost their Fourth Amendment protection 
by leaving garbage on a public street); United States v. Reicherter, 647 F.2d 397, 399 (3d Cir. 
1981) ("Every circuit considering the issue has concluded that no reasonable expectation of 
privacy exists once trash has been placed in a public area for collection."); Commonwealth v. 
Perdue, 564 A.2d 489,493 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) (holding that appellant had no expectation of 
privacy in garbage left in a garbage can on private property but in an area that was open to the 
public). 
245. Winne, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11183, at *lo. 
246. 91 F.R.D. 254 (N.D. Ill. 1981). 
247. Id. at 256. 
248. See id. at 255. 
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Plaintiffs made it a practice of going through defendant's trash to look 
for evidence to confirm their suspicions that defendants were engaged 
in unlawful price di~crimination.2~~ Upon defendant's refusal to answer 
interrogatories based on the documents plaintiff had found in the trash, 
plaintiffs filed a motion to compel an~wers.2~ The Suburban court was 
faced with the issue of whether materials placed in the trash maintain 
their privileged status.=' At the outset, the Suburban court rejected the 
traditional test that disclosure itself was conclusive proof of intent to 
waive.=' Instead, it acknowledged the "modern trend" and applied a 
reasonable precaution test as the measure of intent to ~aive.2'~ 
Though noting that the case presented, a "very close question," the 
court concluded that reasonable precautions were not taken and that the 
attorney-client privilege was waived.2s4 It noted, as did the Winne 
court, that defendants could not have a reasonable expectation of privacy 
in the trash since, under Fourth Amendment considerations, the trash 
would have been deemed abandoned."' The finding of abandonment 
was an indication that reasonable precautions were not taI~en.2'~ 
The courts have developed strikingly similar lines of reasoning in the 
areas of trade secret protection and attorney-client privilege to decide 
when they should protect a privileged document's confidentiality. The 
ABA's analogy to property law to decide when an ethical obligation 
exists to return inadvertently received documents257 is therefore 
consistent with the reasonable precautions test. 
Another way in which the ABA- opinion endorses the reasonable 
precautions test is that, in support of its position that the fact of 
disclosure alone should not strip a document of its confidential status, 
the opinion specifies the five factors contained in the reasonable 
249. Id. at 255-56. 
250. Id. at 256. 
251. Id. at 255. 
252. Id. at 260. 
253." Id. 
254. Id. Commentators have criticized the Suburban holding because, notwithstanding its 
rejection of the traditional test, it appeared to go beyond requiring that reasonable precautions 
be taken, requiring instead that "all possible precautions" be taken. Kanellis, supra note 1, at 
273; Davidson & Voth, supra note 8, at 643-45. Other courts have also criticized its mling. See, 
e.g.. Mendenhall, 531 F. Supp. at 955 n.8 ("With all respect this Court does not concur in Judge 
Leighton's conclusion that the 'case presents a very close question. . . .' ") (citation omitted). 
255. Suburban, 91 F.R.D. at 256; see also Winne, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11 183, at *lo. 
256. Suburban, 91 F.R.D. at 257. The court pointed out that evidence of the use of a 
shredder or other measures to destroy the documents would have had bearing on whether 
reasonable precautions were taken. Id. at 260. The Winne court made the same observation. 
Winne, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11 183, at *12. 
257. See ABA, supra note 15, at 1001:159. 
Heinonline - -  47 Fla. L. Rev. 203 1995 
204 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 47 
precautions test that the courts consider in determining 
Additionally, it refers to the rule embodied by the subjective intent test 
as only a "minority" view and relegates Mendenhall, the seminal 
subjective intent case to a f~otnote."~ If the ABA had intended to 
adopt a rule imposing an ethical obligation to automatically return 
inadvertently disclosed materials, it would not have minimized the 
relevance of the subjective intent test. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Currently, three judicially created tests exist for determining whether 
the inadvertent disclosure of privileged documents waives the attorney- 
client pri~ilege.'~" These tests range from an absolute ban on waiver 
based on inadvertent disclosure (the subjective intent test)261 to an 
absolute finding of waiver based only on the act of disclosure (the 
traditional test).262 In between lies the reasonable precautions test that 
measures intent to waive by the steps taken to avoid inadvertent 
Additionally, the ABA has promulgated a fourth test to 
decide an attorney's ethical obligation to return inadvertently disclosed 
that appears to adopt the subjective intent test, although 
it may be reconciled with the reasonable precautions test.265 Deciding 
which test best serves the parties concerned should be based on the 
underlying goals of the attorney-client privilege and the ethical duty to 
maintain client confidences. The gpals of both are to promote client trust 
in attorneys and to encourage the free flow of inf~rmation.'~~ Basing 
a waiver test on attorney responsibility will best serve these goals. Since 
it is, in fact, the attorney who controls the discovery process, a test that 
measures the attorney's care should be the decisive factor in waiver 
analysis. Under this analysis, the reasonable precautions test, which 
places the most emphasis on attorney action, is the most appropriate 
measure of intent to waive. 
258. See id. at 1001 : 158 (citing Hartman v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 763 P.2d 1 144, 1 152 
(N.M. 1988)). The ABA opinion notes that "[a] review of the relevant cases demonstrates, with 
few exceptions, an unwillingness to permit mere inadvertence to constitute a waiver. Something 
more, like a failure of counsel to spend any time reviewing the documents to be produced in 
discovery, is required before a waiver is found." Id. (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). 
259. Id. at 1001:158 n.3. 
260. See supra text accompanying notes 28-96. 
261. See supra text accompanying notes 43-62. 
262. See supra text accompanying notes 28-42. 
263. See supra text accompanying notes 63-96. 
264. See supra text accompanying notes 98-1 14. 
265. See supra text accompanying notes 100-07. 
266. See supra notes 1 16- 18 and accompanying text. 
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